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ABSTRACT
The aggressive shrinking of transistors, which led to the reductions in the operating volt-
age, has been providing enormous benefits in terms of computational power while keep-
ing the energy consumption at an acceptable level. However, as feature size and voltage
decrease, the susceptibility to soft errors tends to increase, and the importance of fault
evaluations grows. Superscalar processors, which nowadays dominate the market, are a
significant example of systems that take advantage of these technological improvements
and are more susceptible to errors. Along with that, there exist several methods for fault
injection, which is an efficient means to evaluate the resiliency of such processors. How-
ever, traditional fault injection methods, such as the hardware-based technique, impose
that the processor must be physically implemented before the tests can be conducted,
while not providing reasonable levels of controllability. On the other hand, techniques
based on simulators implemented in Software offer high levels of controllability. How-
ever, while high-level SW simulators (which are fast) may lead to an incomplete, or even
misguided, evaluation of the system’s resiliency since they don’t model the hardware in-
ternals (such as the pipeline registers), low-level SW simulators are extremely slow and
are hardly available at RTL (Register-Transfer Level). Considering this scenario, we pro-
pose a platform that bridges the gap between the HW and SW approaches to evaluate
faults in superscalar processors: it is fast, with high controllability, available in software,
flexible, and, most importantly, it models the processor at RTL. The tool was implemented
on top of the framework used to generate the Berkeley Out-of-Order Machine (BOOM)
superscalar processor, which is a highly scalable and parameterizable processor. This
property allowed us to experiment with three different architectures of the processor:
single-, dual-, and quad-issue out-of-order cores, and, by analyzing how the resiliency
to faults is influenced by the complexity of different processors, use them to validate our
tool.
Keywords: Fault injection. superscalar processor. register-transfer level.
RESUMO
A diminuição agressiva dos transistores, a qual levou a reduções na tensão de operação,
vem proporcionando enormes benefícios em termos de poder computacional, mantendo o
consumo de energia em um nível aceitável. No entanto, à medida que o tamanho dos re-
cursos e a tensão diminuem, a susceptibilidade a falhas tende a aumentar e a importância
das avaliações com falhas cresce. Os processadores superescalares, que hoje dominam o
mercado, são um exemplo significativo de sistemas que se beneficiam destas melhorias
tecnológicas e são mais suscetíveis a erros. Juntamente com isso, existem vários métodos
para injeção de falhas, que é um meio eficiente para avaliar a resiliência desses processa-
dores. No entanto, os métodos tradicionais de injeção de falhas, como a técnica baseada
em hardware, impõem que o processador seja implementado fisicamente antes que os tes-
tes possam ser conduzidos, sem fornecer níveis razoáveis de controlabilidade. Por outro
lado, as técnicas baseadas em simuladores implementados em software oferecem altos
níveis de controlabilidade. No entanto, enquanto os simuladores em SW de alto nível
(que são rápidos) podem levar a uma avaliação incompleta, ou mesmo equivocada, da
resiliência do sistema, uma vez que não modelam os componentes internos do hardware
(como os registradores do pipeline), simuladores em SW de baixo nível são extremamente
lentos e dificilmente estão disponíveis em RTL (Register-Transfer Level). Considerando
este cenário, propomos uma plataforma que preenche a lacuna entre as abordagens em
HW e SW para avaliar falhas em processadores superescalares: é rápida, tem alta contro-
labilidade, disponível em software, flexível e, o mais importante, modela o processador
em RTL. A ferramenta foi implementada sobre a plataforma usada para gerar o proces-
sador superescalar The Berkeley Out-of-Order Machine (BOOM), que é um processador
altamente escalável e parametrizável. Esta propriedade nos permitiu experimentar três
arquiteturas diferentes do processador: single-, dual- e quad-issue, e, ao analisar como a
resiliência a falhas é influenciada pela complexidade de diferentes processadores, usamos
os processadores para validar nossa ferramenta.
Palavras-chave: Injeção de falhas , processadores superscalares , nível de transferência
de registradores.
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1 INTRODUCTION
It has been widely reported that the decrease in technology size is allowing for
the implementation of progressively dense and complex processors that boost the com-
putational power to a remarkable level. However, achieving even higher performance
while keeping energy consumption at an acceptable level comes at a price, and there are
trade-offs that should be taken into account.
Much of the improvement in computational performance is a consequence of the
technology advances that nowadays allow the multiplication of resources in complex pro-
cessors, such as the superscalar ones. Nowadays, superscalar processors dominate the
market due to their efficiency. Therefore, reliability research should pay special attention
to them.
The technology shrinking resulted in the improvements of superscalar processors
because it allowed more transistors to be packed in the same area, resulting in more com-
plex structures and in the multiplication of resources that makes it possible to execute
more instructions per cycle. This achievement was mainly possible due to the increase of
the density of transistors enabled by technology scaling, which is a consequence of the
ameliorations in the complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) technology, as
transistors tend to be smaller and faster (DODD et al., 2010).
As a consequence of the technology scaling, transistors must now operate at lower
voltages since the amount of charge necessary to change a single bit in a state element
(the critical charge) has decreased. More precisely, as transistors’ shrink, the voltage has
to be reduced to prevent them from wearing out or collapsing due to high electric fields
because the critical charge decreases linearly with the voltage (KARNIK; HAZUCHA,
2004).
As it seems to be a natural law, it is impossible to achieve any sort of improvement
while not paying the price for it. Most of the advances in computational power were
enabled by the technology shrinking, which led to an increase in the rate of soft errors.
However, due to the growing demand for performance that can mainly be explored
by means of instruction-level parallelism (ILP), superscalar processors are of increasing
relevance for many of the everyday applications. As this demand for superscalar pro-
cessors is accompanied by the increasing levels of sensitivity of the transistors, research
should pay special attention regarding fault tolerance strategies for such processors. How-
ever, the design of efficient fault tolerance mechanisms demand that the system’s behav-
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ior should be first evaluated when it is subject to faults. By evaluating, it is meant that
the processor should be artificially deployed in harsh conditions where the environment
constantly injects faults into it, all the while its behavior is observed. This way, an un-
derstanding of the system’s behavior when it encounters faults is provided. Therefore, in
this work, we present a fault injection platform for the Berkeley Out-of-Order Machine
(BOOM) superscalar processor.
1.1 Problem Statement and Context of this Work
One of the most common and efficient strategies adopted for the evaluation of a
system’s sensitivity to faults is fault injection, which consists in intentionally flipping the
bits of the processor in a scale way bigger than it would experience in a real environment.
However, often some of the fault injection techniques, such as hardware-based methods
and methods based on high-level simulators have inherent deficiencies and trade-offs.
Even though the good level of representativity of the hardware-based fault injec-
tion method is attractive, it demands that the system is physically implemented before
it can be evaluated, hence its levels of accessibility is not much encouraging, and it is
also expensive because it requires special equipment to induce faults. Moreover, there
is no easy way, if any, of controlling where and when faults should be injected into the
hardware.
When the hardware-based method does not satisfy due to its shortcomings, one
could take advantage of more abstract methods, such as the ones that use high-level simu-
lators. In this scenario, the system is represented by means of a software-based simulator
that abstracts several of the micro-architectural structures of the system. In many cases,
such simulators are so high-level that they model only the functional aspect of the system.
However, as the processor is modeled in software, the levels of controllability and acces-
sibility are attractive. Note, however, that this strategy does not model the system at RTL,
which may lead to loss of representativity when the reliability is evaluated.
Therefore, the importance of this dissertation is based on three main claims:
1. Superscalar processors are becoming even more important and ubiquitous.
2. Superscalar processors are becoming more sensitive to faults due to technology
scaling.
3. There is a growing need for efficient tools to evaluate the resiliency of superscalar
13
processors.
Items (1) and (2) tell that the resiliency evaluation of superscalar processors is of
growing importance. Item (3) is accompanied by the fact that there is a trade-off between
hardware-based methods and strategies that use high-level simulators. For this reason, in
this work, we proposed and implemented a platform for the evaluation of the susceptibility
to soft errors of the BOOM superscalar processor.
The proposed platform trades off the deficiencies imposed by hardware- and simulation-
based methods as it is based on an RTL software-implemented model of the processor,
hence it inherits levels of representativeness close to the hardware-based method, and the
levels of controllability of the techniques based on simulators.
We believe that fault evaluations of BOOM can provide significant understandings
about the processor’s behavior when it is deployed in harsh environments, mainly because
the proposed tool works at RTL. Besides, the proposed platform is based on a highly flex-
ible simulator generator that allows us to parameterize several features of the processor,
such as the issue-width. Because it is easy to parameterize the BOOM processor, we
evaluated three versions of it: single-, dual-, and quad-issue cores were experimented.
Because the proposed platform is based on a software-implemented simulator that
works at RTL (thus every single bit of the processor is modeled), it should be no sur-
prise that the fault injection process is not as fast as the methods based on high-level and
functional simulators. Therefore, we implemented a checkpointing mechanism in order
to speedup the fault injection campaigns; this trick yielded remarkable gains in terms of
number of faults injected per second.
This dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2: Reviews the basics on superscalar processors and gives an overview,
to a certain detail, of the BOOM’s architecture, its ISA, and the Chisel language.
• Chapter 3: Gives a background on soft errors and presents some related fault in-
jection tools.
• Chapter 4: Details how the proposed platform was implemented and how it works.
• Chapter 5: Evaluates the implemented tool by injecting faults in the BOOM pro-
cessor.
• Chapter 6: Final conclusions and suggestions for future work.
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2 BOOM - THE BERKELEY OUT-OF-ORDER MACHINE
2.1 Introduction
As demand for performance increases, the importance of superscalar processors
also grows since they deliver significant gains in terms of instructions per cycle (IPC) at
an acceptable cost.
Superscalar processors functionality, such as in (PALACHARLA; JOUPPI; SMITH,
1997), consists of issuing and executing multiple instructions per cycle. This organi-
zation is possible nowadays due to technology improvements that allow the multiplica-
tion of resources of the processor, such as multiple functional units. By benefiting from
multiple functional units, speculative execution and instruction scheduling (static or dy-
namic), superscalar designs achieved such a significant performance that nowadays they
lead the market of embedded systems. Basically, superscalar processors deliver better
performance by exploring instruction-level parallelism (SMITH; SOHI, 1995).
2.1.1 The Basic Functionality of Superscalar Processors
Generally speaking, superscalar processors may be categorized into two types: in-
order and out-of-order execution. For the in-order execution case, the instructions are
statically scheduled (at compile time) and are executed in the same order the programmer
would expect they should execute. In other words, instructions are executed in the same
sequence as they are fetched from the instruction memory.
One shortcoming imposed by in-order execution is related to some aspects of the
program flow that can bring the processor performance down. For example, when one
instruction depends upon the results of a previous one and this hazard cannot be resolved
by any means, then the pipeline has to stall until the first instruction completes. This usu-
ally happens when the results from the previous instruction arrive from load operations,
which have a high latency when there is a cache miss. Stalling the processor implies that
some structures of the processor will be kept idle, which in turn harms the processor per-
formance. This problem can be attenuated by executing instructions out of the program
order.
The out-of-order execution allows for the processor to dynamically schedule and
execute decoded instructions out of the expected order. This technique can significantly
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reduce the impact of some data dependencies, as happens with the in-order example afore-
mentioned. In this scenario, when the next instruction depends upon the results of a pre-
vious load instruction, then instead of stalling the pipeline, the processor can execute
another instruction, ahead of the next one, that has no dependencies yet to be resolved. In
short, out-of-order processors increase performance because they are keen on: 1) finding
more instructions that can execute in parallel (i.e., they explore ILP); and 2) tolerating/-
masking instruction latencies, such as load operations. Simply put, out-of-order execution
increases the processor’s performance (ACOSTA; KJELSTRUP; TORNG, 1986).
Authors in (PALACHARLA; JOUPPI; SMITH, 1997) describe the basic func-
tionality of the pipeline of a generic and abstract superscalar processor, which may be
summarized as:
1. Multiple instructions are fetched every cycle from the instruction cache, and branch
prediction is made for conditional branch instructions.
2. Instructions are decoded and their register operands are renamed to resolve false de-
pendencies. Renamed instructions are dispatched to the instruction window, where
they wait for their source operands and the appropriate functional unit, such as
ALUs or FPUs, to become available.
3. As soon as the conditions in (2) are satisfied, instructions are issued and executed
in the functional units. The operand values of an instruction are either fetched from
the register file or are bypassed (through a bypass logic) from earlier instructions in
the pipeline.
The next sections present the basic architecture and organization of the BOOM
processor, which fits into the out-of-order category.
2.2 An Overview on The Berkeley Out-of-Order Machine
2.2.1 Introduction
The development of a fault injection platform demands, of course, a careful choice
of the processor the fault injector is supposed to be built upon.
An initial alternative for such processor could be, for example, the OpenSPARC
T1 processor (PARULKAR et al., 2008), which was developed by Sun Microsystems
and released as an open-source Verilog project to the public back in 2006. Benefiting
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from an RTL description of the processor sounds attractive, however, as this processor is
developed as a multithreading/multicore CPU (it contains eight cores), it turned out to be
too complicated for our purposes. Moreover, OpenSPARC T1 does not support out-of-
order execution and has the disadvantage of not being parameterizable; one cannot just
easily configure the processor in a desired way. As a consequence, the fault injection
platform would be restricted only to one processor configuration.
As an alternative to OpenSPARC, one could resort to the gem5 simulator (BINKERT
et al., 2011), for instance, which is a very popular and low-level open-source simulator in
academia. However, even though gem5 may provide some reasonable degree of hardware
representativity, it does not model any processor at RTL.
The Berkeley Out-of-Order Machine (BOOM) processor was chosen as an alter-
native to the aforementioned strategies, its RTL description is open-source and is not as
complex as the OpenSPARC one. These properties already justify choosing BOOM as
our target processor. However, BOOM has also the advantage of being parameterizable,
hence it facilitates the evaluation of a vast range of different processor configurations.
BOOM is a superscalar, out-of-order RISC core designed to serve as the prototyp-
ical baseline processor for future micro-architectural studies of out-of-order processors
(CELIO; PATTERSON; ASANOVIé, 2015). It is inspired by the MIPS R10k (YEAGER,
1996) and in the Alpha 21264 (KESSLER, 1999) out-of-order processors. It implements
the RISC-V instruction set architecture (ISA), detailed in (WATERMAN et al., 2014) and
(WATERMAN, 2016). This ISA is shortly reviewed in Section 2.4.
BOOM is currently embedded in the Rocket Chip System on Chip (SoC) generator,
presented in (ASANOVIc´ et al., 2016). Most notably, BOOM is developed in the Chisel
hardware construction language, which is introduced in Section 2.3.
Since this work is about a fault injection platform for the BOOM processor, it
is important to introduce its basic architectural functionalities. A basic knowledge of
the hardware structures of the processor is necessary to understand its behavior under
the presence of faults. Therefore, the architecture and organization of the processor are
described in the next sections.
2.2.2 Architecture and Organization
BOOM supports pipelined execution of multiple instructions in the same cycle.
In theory, instructions may execute in up to 10 pipeline stages: Fetch, Decode, Regis-
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Figure 2.1: A high-level view of the BOOM processor.
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ter Rename, Dispatch, Issue, Register Read, Execute, Memory, Writeback, and Commit.
But, in practice, BOOM combines some of the stages, which reduces the pipeline to
six stages: Fetch, Decode/Rename/Dispatch, Issue/Register Read, Execute, Memory, and
Writeback. The instruction commit stage (sometimes called instruction retirement) occurs
asynchronously so it is not considered part of the pipeline.
Figure 2.1 depicts a high-level model of the BOOM processor. The main point of
interest of the following sections is to point out some of the hardware components that
constitute the processor, which are subject of interest for the BOOM’s fault sensitivity
analysis and characterization. As Figure 2.1 shows, the processor is constituted of:
• Register file (RF): A unified physical register file constituted of many more registers
than the programmer-visible logical registers.
• Reorder buffer (ROB): Hardware component responsible for committing the in-
structions in order, even though they are executed out of order. The ROB makes sure
the out-of-order execution of the instructions does not change the expected program
behavior by providing the "illusion" that instructions execute in-order, preserving
the meaning of the program. Also, the ROB facilitates the branch prediction of the
processor and guarantees precise exception handling.
• Issue window: Instructions are decoded and placed in the instruction window,
where they wait until their resources are free so that they can be issued and exe-
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cuted.
• Branch predictor: Constituted of a branch history table (BHT), a branch target
buffer (BTB), a return address stack (RAS), and other components responsible for
the management of branch prediction.
• Register rename: Circuitry that handles the register renaming process by mapping
logical registers into physical registers, so that some data hazards can be resolved.
It enhances the processor performance by increasing the ILP.
• Load/store queue: Constituted of three queues: Load Address Queue (LAQ), Store
Address Queue (SAQ), and Store Data Queue (SDQ). These queues are responsible
for handling memory operations when load and store instructions execute.
• Execution units and bypass network: Constituted of arithmetic and logic units
(ALU), floating point units (FPU), and integer multipliers and dividers. ALU re-
sults may be fed back (bypassed) to the ALU operands before results are written to
the RF or memory.
As can be observed in Figure 2.1, BOOM is divided into a front-end and a back-
end "part". The front-end handles the instruction fetch and a single-cycle branch pre-
diction; in this stage, instructions are fetched from the instruction memory and written
into a fetch buffer of instruction. The fetch buffer decouples the instruction fetch stage
in the front-end from the subsequent stages in the back-end (Decode/Rename/Dispatch,
Issue/Register Read, Execute, Memory, and Writeback).
BOOM’s instruction pipeline functionality may be summarized as follows: first,
a packet of instructions is fetched from the instruction cache and is stored in the fetch
buffer of instructions while branch prediction is made if there are branch instructions in
the packet. Later, instructions residing in this buffer are pulled out and decoded and the
logical identifiers of the registers in the instructions are mapped into physical registers
residing in the register file (i.e., register renaming). In the same cycle, the instructions are
dispatched to the ROB and to the instruction window.
Instructions residing in the instruction window wait there until all their resources
are available, when they can finally be issued out of the instruction window and begin
execution. Once the instruction ends execution, it then sends signals to the reorder buffer,
which takes the appropriate actions to make the state of the instruction visible (i.e., re-
sults are written in the RF or memory) by committing the instruction if it was not miss-
speculated and did not cause any exception.
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Figure 2.2: The fetch unit of the BOOM processor.
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2.2.2.1 Instruction Fetch
The front-end is responsible for fetching a fetch packet of instructions from the
instruction memory and storing them in a fetch buffer of instructions (a First-in/First-
out queue). In the subsequent pipeline stages, instructions residing in the fetch buffer
are decoded and renamed before they are stored in the instruction window and in the
ROB. These phases are handled in-order, and out-of-order execution only starts when
instructions are issued out from the instruction window to the execute stage.
Figure 2.2 depicts the BOOM’s fetch unit. As multiple instructions may execute
at the same cycle, BOOM fetches a packet of instructions each cycle. Instructions being
fetched from the instruction memory are place in a First-in First-out (FIFO) fetch packet
of instructions.
In parallel with the instruction fetch, BOOM predicts every cycle (and in a single
cycle) where the next instruction should be fetched from by using the Next-line predic-
tor (NLP) branch prediction strategy. The BOOM’s branch predictor will be detailed in
Section 2.2.2.9.
2.2.2.2 Instruction Decode
The decode stage takes instructions from the fetch buffer (in-order), decodes them,
and allocates the necessary resources as needed by each instruction. This stage will stall if
not all resources are available. Otherwise, after instructions are decoded, they are renamed
and dispatched to the instruction window and to the reorder buffer, as shown in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: The instruction decode unit.
Source: Adapted from (CELIO; PATTERSON; ASANOVIé, 2016)
2.2.2.3 Register Renaming
As stated in Section 2.1, superscalar processors make extensive use of ILP. But due
to the limited number of logical registers in most processors, the ILP may be drastically
reduced by data hazards, such as true dependencies, or read after write (RAW), output
dependencies, or write after write (WAW), and anti-dependences, or writer after read
(WAR).
Register renaming is a technique used to overcome the WAW and WAR hazards. It
consists in mapping the logical registers (those visible by the programmer) into physical
registers in the register file.
Even though the RISC-V ISA defines 32 user-visible (logical) registers, BOOM
implements a physical register file with many more registers that hold both the commit-
ted architectural register state and speculative register state. Also, BOOM implements a
unified physical register file: both integer and floating point registers reside in a single
register file.
BOOM relies on an explicit renaming technique, which means the logical registers
are explicitly mapped to physical register in a register file by means of rename map tables,
which maps logical registers to physical ones by using the logical register identifiers as
indexes.
Register renaming also requires circuitry to detect dependencies between registers
being renamed. For instance, when a register being renamed depends upon an earlier
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instruction, the dependency check logic consists in setting the appropriate control signals
in the multiplexers depicted in Figure 2.4 which select the appropriate physical register
designator.
The state of the physical registers has to be tracked every cycle, so that appropriate
actions may be taken during the register renaming process. The main hardware structures
that handle the renaming are:
• Map table: The Rename Map Table contains the assignments from logical to phys-
ical registers. More precisely, it contains the speculative mappings from ISA reg-
isters to physical registers. Each branch will have its own copy of the rename map
table, if there is a branch mispredict, the map table can be reset instantly from the
mispredicting branch’s copy of the map table.
• Free list: The free-list is a bit-vector that tracks the physical registers that are cur-
rently unused and is used to allocate new physical registers to instructions passing
through the Rename stage. It contains as many bits as there are registers in the phys-
ical register file. A value ’1’ in the bit 5, for example, means the physical register
of index 5 is free. Multiple registers may be allocated in a single cycle.
• Busy table: This structure holds the status and readiness of the physical regis-
ters. When an instruction is to be issued, the busy table is consulted to check if
its operands are ready and contain valid values. When a register leaves the free list,
Figure 2.4: The rename stage - logical registers are mapped into physical ones.
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its corresponding bit in the busy table is set to the busy state. When a register is
written by an execution unit, its corresponding bit in the busy table is reset.
• Stale destination specifiers: For instructions that will write a register, the map table
is read to get the stale physical destination specifier (stale pdst). Once the instruc-
tion commits, the stale pdst is returned to the free list, as no future instructions will
read it.
Figure 2.4 depicts a high-level view of the register renaming circuitry. Up to two in-
structions go through the rename stage at the same cycle and their respective source and
destination registers are compared in order to detect possibly dependencies. Any renamed
register has to be passed to dependent instructions. When the logical registers read the
map table, physical registers are provided for the instruction and the free list and busy
table are updated.
2.2.2.4 The Instruction Issue Unit
Once instructions are decoded and renamed, micro-operations are generated and
then dispatched to the instruction window where they wait until all of their operands are
ready and resources such as execution units are free. The ’p’ bit depicted in Figure 2.5
stands for presence, and indicates when the source registers are available in the register
file. Once this criterion is met, the instruction can be issued by setting a request bit high.
The issue select logic selects a slot with a request bit high. Issued micro-operations can
then read their operands in the register file and their issue slot is freed to make room for
another dispatched instruction.
BOOM’s instruction window is unified, thus both integer and floating point in-
structions are placed in a single issue window. An issue slot is depicted in Figure 2.5.
There are two issue policies available in BOOM:
• Age-ordered Issue: dispatched instructions are placed into the bottom of the is-
sue window (at lowest priority). Every cycle, every instruction is shifted upwards.
Thus, the oldest instructions will have the highest issue priority. For out-of-order
superscalars, branches and load instructions should be resolved as soon as possible,
hence this policy can increase the performance of the processor since instructions’
priorities tend to increase, hence branches and loads would not be "stuck" at low
priorities. However, this policy may result in poor energetic performance since each
slot may have to be read and write at each cycle.
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Figure 2.5: The issue slot.
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• Un-ordered Issue: dispatched instructions are placed into the first available issue
window slot and remain there until they are issued. This policy may harm the
performance if branches or loads are inserted in the lowest priority slots and are not
able to be issued as soon as possible. However, there is no energy penalty such as
in the Age-ordered Issue.
Each issue select logic port uses a static-priority encoder that selects the first avail-
able instruction in the issue window. Each port will only schedule an operation that its port
can handle (e.g., floating point micro-ops will only be scheduled onto the port governing
the Floating Point Unit).
2.2.2.5 The Execute Stage
BOOM makes use of Execute Units (EUs) in order to operate on data. Each EU
will hold different units of execution, as depicted in the dual-issue version of BOOM in
Figure 2.6.
Different EUs are composed of different functional units to execute specific in-
structions. As an example, in Figure 2.6 the Execution Unit #0 handles ALU, FPU and
integer multiplication operations, while the Execution Unit #1 handles ALU, integer di-
vision and load/store operations.
Each EU is connected to a single issue port in the Issue Window, so for each issue
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Figure 2.6: A dual-issue BOOM has two Execute Units.
Source: Adapted from (CELIO; PATTERSON; ASANOVIé, 2016)
port, there will be only one associated EU. Therefore, the number of EUs in BOOM
corresponds to the processor’s issue-width, so for a dual-issue, for example, there are
two EUs. Instructions are issued to the appropriate EU by an Issue scheduler. The issue
scheduler will only schedule instructions that the Execution Unit supports.
2.2.2.6 The Register File and Bypass Network
BOOM has a unified physical register file (PRF), which dictates that the register
file holds both the integer, floating point, committed and speculative instructions.
As the BOOM’s floating point functional units work with 65-bit operands, the
register file is comprised of 65-bit registers. ALU operations can be issued back-to-back
by having the write-back values forwarded through the bypass network. Bypassing occurs
at the end of the Register Read stage.
The number of read and write ports in the register file depends on the issue width.
For a single-issue processor, for instance, the register file needs 3 read ports to satisfy
fused multiply–add (FMA) 1 operations and 2 write ports.
For the issued instructions, the register file statically provides the register read
ports as in the following example: if for a dual-issue processor, for example, issue port
#0 provides access to the Execute Unit that holds an ALU, and issue port#1 provides
access to the Execute Unit that handles FPU operations, then the first two read ports will
statically serve the ALU, and the remaining three read ports will operate on the FPU.
1FMA is a floating-point multiply–add operation performed in one step. For operations such as a x b + c,
the whole expression is first evaluated, then the result is rounded. This contrasts with unfused multiply–add,
where the product a x b is first calculated and rounded, then the result is added to c and, finally, it is rounded
again.
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2.2.2.7 The Load/Store Unit
Load and store instructions are handled by means of the Load/Store Unit (LSU),
which consists of three queues: the Load Address Queue (LAQ), the Store Address Queue
(SAQ), and the Store Data Queue (SDQ). The LSU decides when memory operations
should be fired to the memory.
When a load instruction is issued, its address is first calculated and placed in the
LAQ. Stores are inserted into the issue window (dispatched) as a single instruction (i.e., a
single instruction handles address and data generation). When a store instruction is issued,
two actions may be taken depending on the conditions, it may either fire a Store Address
Generation (STA), or a Store Data Generation (STD). The STA micro-op calculates the
store address and places its result in the SAQ queue. The STD micro-op moves the store
data from the register file to the SDQ. Each of these micro-ops will issue out of the Issue
Window as soon their operands are ready. More precisely, load and store instructions are
performed as follows:
• Store instructions: Stores are issued out of the instruction window to the LSU.
When both operands are ready, the store can be issued to the LSU as a single micro-
op which provides both the address and the data. However, often the address will
be available before the data, hence only the STA micro-op is issued to the SAQ to
allow later loads to avoid any memory ordering failures. Once a store instruction
is committed, the corresponding entry in the Store Queue is marked as committed.
The store is then free to be fired to the memory system. Stores are fired to the
memory in program order.
• Load instructions: For loads, entries in the LAQ are allocated during the Decode
stage. In Decode, each load entry is also given a store mask, which marks which
stores in the Store Queue the given load depends on (if any). Loads are fired to
memory as soon as they arrive in the LAQ, because reading memory contents as
soon as possible is convenient for out-or-order pipelines. When a load is to be
performed, its load address is simultaneously compared to all the store address it
depends on, if there is a match, the memory request is killed. If the corresponding
store data is present, then the store data is forwarded to the load and the load is
considered successful. If the store data is not present in the SDQ, then the load
goes to sleep, where they wait until they are retried at a later time.
The LSU must also handle load/store dependencies, which happens when a load
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instruction depends on the contents of a memory address written by a previous store in-
struction. Such dependencies may cause memory order failures. If an ordering failure
occurs, then the pipeline must be flushed and the rename map tables are reset.
To discover ordering failures, when a store commits, it checks the entire LAQ for
any address matches. If there is a match, the store checks to see if the load has executed,
and if it got its data from memory or if the data was forwarded from an older store. In
either case, a memory ordering failure has occurred.
2.2.2.8 The Reorder Buffer and the Commit Stage
The reorder buffer (ROB) is a circular buffer organized with N banks, where N is
the dispatch and commit width of the machine (see Figure 2.7). The ROB tracks the state
of all inflight instructions in-order. After instructions are decoded and renamed, they are
dispatched from the fetch packet and written into the tail of the ROB.
Each dispatched instruction is written to a different bank across a row in the ROB.
Once instructions are dispatched, they are marked as busy, which means the instructions
are not complete. By doing so, older instructions will always reside in the head of the
ROB, while the newest ones will reside in the tail.
Once instructions end execution, they are marked as not busy. When a not busy
instruction "moves" to the head of the ROB, and it is not miss-speculated and did not
cause any exception, it is then committed and its results are made architecturally visible.
As an example, Figure 2.7 depicts the ROB of a two-wide version of BOOM. Up
Figure 2.7: A ROB for a two-wide BOOM - up to two instructions can be dispatched and
written to a single ROB row.
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to two instructions can be dispatched to the ROB per cycle, each of them will be written
to the head of the two ROB banks, and they will be written in the same row. In that case,
a ROB row consists of two instructions, which is the maximum number of instructions
that can be committed in a cycle 2.
Since superscalar commit is supported, the entire ROB row is analyzed for not
busy instructions, so that the ROB may commit as many instructions as possible per row
in a single cycle, which in turn releases as many resources as possible. Be aware that the
ROB does not look across multiple rows in order to find instructions that can be committed
(i.e., only the ROB head is committed in a cycle).
As can be seen in Figure 2.7, for each bank in the ROB, each row contains a
branch mask that "tells" the instruction in the bank of a row which branch the instruction
is speculated under. If a micro-op in the ROB "belongs" to a miss-speculated branch, it is
then flushed and its architectural state is not made visible.
The ROB must know the PC for each inflight instruction since 1) any instruction
may cause exceptions, so the exception program counter (EPC) must be known for latter
recovery of the program context, 2) branch and jump instructions must know their own
PC for the correct target calculation, and 3) jump-register instructions must know both
their own PC and the PC of the following instruction to verify if the front-end predicted
the correct JR target. Since instructions are fetched, decoded and dispatched to the ROB
in-order (hence are located consecutively in memory), keeping a single PC for each ROB
row is enough.
Each entry in the ROB is marked with an exc flag that indicates whether or not the
instruction has caused an exception. An exception will be thrown only if the excepting
instruction is in the head of the ROB. When an exception is thrown, the pipeline is flushed
and the ROB emptied.
Note that the instruction is still speculative during the register renaming stage,
thus the correspondence between physical and logical registers stored in the rename map
tables may be miss-speculated. If that is the case, the rename map tables will be invalid.
Therefore, if the head of the ROB is marked as not busy (i.e., if the instruction ends
execution) and it is miss-speculated or caused an exception, then the rename map tables
must be reset so that the miss-speculated or excepting mapping of logical to physical
registers is eliminated, and the correct architectural state is maintained.
2Note that the dispatch and commit width are the same.
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2.2.2.9 The Branch Predictor
BOOM supports branch prediction and speculation. The branch prediction occurs
at two distinct levels: while one prediction is made combinationally by the Next-Line
Predictor (NLP) in the BOOM’s front-end during the instruction fetch, another prediction
is made by the Backing Predictor (BPD) in the back-end part.
During the instruction fetch, the NLP takes the current Fetch-PC (the current pro-
gram counter that fetches the fetch packet of instructions) as input and works together
with a branch history table (BHT), a branch target buffer (BTB) and a return address
stack (RAS) depending on what kind of instruction is being speculated (conditional, un-
conditional or a return instruction).
First, the Fetch-PC is compared to all entries (PC tags) in the BTB in order to find
any tag match. If a match occurs, and if the current instructions is a ret, then the return
address for the instruction is retrieved from the RAS. If the instruction is a conditional
branch, then the BHT is consulted in order to make the prediction, and the predicted
branch target will be retrieved from the BTB so that the NLP does not have to wait for the
execute stage to calculate the target address. If the instruction is an unconditional branch,
then the BHT is not consulted.
Since the NLP has to store PC tags and branch targets in the BTB, it becomes
really expensive in terms of area and power, so only a few dozen branch predictions can
be stored. To overcome that, BOOM makes use of the BPD as a second level branch
predictor. The BPD is not as expensive in terms of power and area as the NLP because
it does not retrieve branch targets from the BTB, instead, it actually computes the target
address during the execute state.
The BPD does not make any prediction before the fetch packet has been decoded
and the branch targets are computed directly from the instructions themselves. Therefore,
there is no need for the BPD to store predicted target addresses.
When a prediction is being performed in the subsequent stages in the back-end,
the BPD provides a bit-vector of taken/not-taken predictions, for which there is one bit for
each instruction fetched. When the instructions from the fetch packet are decoded and the
target branches are calculated, the prediction bits in the bit-vector are consulted in order
to decide if the processor’s front-end has to be redirected or not. The BPD will be updated
in two distinct phases: during the execute stage, if a misprediction is detected, and during
the commit stage so that the branch prediction is updated only with non-speculative state.
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2.2.3 Parameterization of the BOOM Processor
As will be detailed in Section 2.3, Chisel enhanced the way modern and com-
plex systems are designed by benefiting from facilities that allow the step-by-step and
high-level development of individual components that together may form a more com-
plex system, such as a processor.
BOOM was implemented in the Chisel hardware construction language and, by
convenience of design, there are "knobs" in its source code that make it easy to param-
eterize the processor. This way, for BOOM, the main structure sizes of the processor
can be chosen by the user before the processor description is compiled, and no further
modifications in the source code of the processor are required.
Some of the possible configurations of the BOOM processor that can be easily
parameterized are:
1. Fetch/Decode/Commit width: Defines the maximum number of instructions that
can be fetched, decoded and committed per cycle. Note that the maximum number
of decoded and committed instructions in a cycle, on average, is limited by the
fetch width, so actually only the maximum number of fetched instructions has to be
parameterized.
2. Issue width: Defines the maximum number of instructions that can be issued out of
the instruction window in a cycle.
3. Issue scheduler policy: Can be selected as Un-ordered or Age-ordered.
4. Map table: The commit map table can enable or disabled.
5. ROB size: Defines the number of entries in the ROB.
6. Issue window size: Defines the number of instructions that can reside in the instruc-
tion window.
7. LSU size: Defines the number of entries in the load/store queues.
8. RF size: Defines the number of physical registers in the RF.
9. Fetch buffer size: Defines the size of the fetch buffer that holds the fetched instruc-
tions.
10. Enable/Disable BPU: The backing branch predictor can be either enabled or dis-
abled.
11. Max in-flight branches: Defines the maximum number of branches that can be is-
sued per cycle.
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12. RAS/BTB: Defines the sizes of the RAS and BTB structures.
13. Cache configurations: Defines the number of sets and ways in the L1 instruction
and data caches. It is also possible to enable or disable the L2 cache and configure
its parameters.
14. Latencies: The FPU and integer and multiplier and dividers latencies can be de-
fined.
Note that because it is easy to parameterize the BOOM processor, and there are
plenty of possibilities that can be parameterized, the design space to be explored in terms
of fault injection and fault tolerance tends to be high. In our fault injection analysis, for
instance, we could easily experiment with three different configurations of the BOOM
processor just by setting the appropriate values of the structure sizes.
2.3 Chisel - Constructing Hardware in an Scala Embedded Language
BOOM is developed in the Chisel (Constructing hardware in a Scala embedded
language) hardware construction language, which is derived from the Scala programming
language (BACHRACH et al., 2012). This language can be understood as a set of pre-
defined classes and libraries embedded in Scala. Chisel leverages Scala and gives it the
ability to abstract and to design hardware components with high-level programming fea-
tures, such as object orientation, functional programming, parameterized types, and type
inference.
Moreover, Chisel can generate optimized C++-based cycle-accurate simulators
and low-level Verilog that can be mapped either to field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
or application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). The various Chisel backends are shown
in Figure 2.8.
The Chisel language was elaborated aiming to solve three common problems faced
by traditional hardware description languages (HDLs):
1. Because the most popular hardware-description languages (e.g., Verilog/VHDL)
were originally developed as hardware simulation languages, they were only later
adopted for hardware synthesis, hence their semantics are based on simulation,
which complicates synthesizable designs.
2. These languages did not evolve at the same pace modern programming languages
did. So they lack the powerful abstraction facilities that are common in modern
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software languages, such as the object-oriented paradigm. This aspect lowers the
productivity as it is difficult to reuse components, for example.
3. These languages make it difficult to explore the design-space of complex structures,
as they have limited module generation facilities, which makes it difficult to produce
and compose highly parameterized modules required to support thorough design-
space exploration.
To overcome the deficiencies in (1)-(3), Chisel was designed as a language that
leverages great ideas in software engineering in hardware design. In other words, Chisel
takes the modern facilities and aspects of a modern programing language (Scala) and
enhances the design of complex, parameterizable, flexible and synthesizable hardware
structures. Therefore, the language improves the productivity as its modern features pro-
vide facilities to design hardware by composing smaller and reusable structures with way
better semantics than Verilog/VHDL.
Differently from the traditional concept of HDLs, where the hardware description
is translated into a netlist, Chisel works by a transformation of its source code into equiv-
alent C++/Verilog source codes. Since Scala is compiled to Java bytecodes, the process
of code translation from Scala to C++/Verilog works by compiling the Scala and then
running such bytecodes in the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). The JVM then constructs an
abstract syntax tree (AST) representing the hardware description, which in turn is trans-
lated into C++/Verilog equivalent source codes.
The C++ Chisel-exported code defines an “RTL” object-oriented simulator that
Figure 2.8: The Chisel code transformation flow.
Source: Author
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Figure 2.9: Chisel description of the multiplexer and its equivalent transformed C++.
(a) Chisel description of the multiplexer. (b) C++-transformed multiplexer module.
(c) C++ behavioral description of the mul-
tiplexer. (d) An instance of the multiplexer.
Source: Author
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honors the behavior of the system in a low-level mode. One could consider this exported
simulator as being, somehow, a C++ RTL description of the system, since it is as detailed
as its corresponding Verilog representation.
Figure 2.9 depicts an example of a two-input multiplexer written in Chisel and its
C++-transformed code. After this model is described in Chisel, the Chisel build process
generates the equivalent C++-modeled simulator in Figure 2.9b.
Note how high-level the Chisel model is; even the clock signal is implicit to the
designer, so it is not necessary to handle clock events. Conversely, Verilog/VHDL mod-
els have to manage clock events explicitly. In Chisel, the clock signal is automatically
created in the corresponding C++ model, as can be seen in Figure 2.9b. Also, note how
there are high-level classes such as Reg that create abstract concepts of elements, which
is a sophisticated object-orientation semantics applied in hardware descriptions. These
object-oriented concepts may increase the designer productivity significantly.
Figure 2.9b depicts the equivalent multiplexer module transformed into C++. The
C++ simulator is based on a fast multi-word library using C++ template classes, where
the signals and registers are represented by the dat_t special class definition (memories
defined in Chisel will be represented as mem_t objects in C++). Note also that the Chisel
transformation topologically sorts nodes based on dependencies by preserving the original
variable names while prefixing them with their top module name.
Figure 2.9c depicts the behavioral description of the multiplexer. The behavior of
the system in the exported code is based on the clock_lo(), and clock_hi() primitives. The
clock_lo() method handles all of the combinational updates, while the clock_hi() handles
the sequential ones. Notice that this model yields a cycle-accurate representation of the
system.
Figure 2.9d depicts an example instance and usage of the multiplexer module. In
this phase, all the user has to do is to feed the module with the inputs and invoke the
clock_lo() and clock_hi() method appropriately.
Notice in Figure 2.9 that there is a 1:1 correspondence between the Chisel model
and the C++-exported code (also valid for the Verilog-exported one). Each signal and
register represented in the Chisel will be represented in the C++ simulator with exactly
the same number of bits. In other words, there is no single loss of information about the
system’s model when the code is transformed from Chisel to C++.
As simulation speed is often an important aspect to be considered, a study in
(BACHRACH et al., 2012) compared the performance of the C++-based simulator to
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Figure 2.10: Performance of the Chisel-generated Verilog/C++.
(a) Simulation times for the Chisel C++ simulator, Synopsys VCS Verilog simulation, and FPGA emula-
tion when a 64-bit five-stage RISC processor boots an OS.
(b) Total time required to compile and simulate a system us-
ing various Chisel back-ends.
Source: Adapted from (BACHRACH et al., 2012)
the performance of the equivalent Verilog by using the Synopsys Verilog Compiler Simu-
lator (VCS), where an RISC five-stage pipelined processor was implemented and used to
boot an operating system (OS). Figure 2.10 compares the significant difference between
performances of various Chisel backends.
Results show that the C++ simulator booted the OS 7.7 times faster than the VCS
simulator, as shown in Figure 2.10a. This figure compares the total time taken (compile
time + run time) for various Chisel backends in order to boot the OS.
Notice how the compilation time is the bottleneck for the FPGA, so even though
the FPGA boots the OS about 575/76 ≈ 7.5 times faster than the C++ simulator, the total
time required to compile the processor and to configure the FPGA makes it slower than
the C++ backend. Because compilation time is not negligible and it is constant, the fastest
method will depend on the number of cycles the application executes. As an example, note
that the C++ simulator will only be faster than the VCS when millions or more cycles are
simulated, this limit is highlighted by the red dash in Figure 2.10b. Notice also that the
performance of the C++ simulator is highly dependent on compiler optimizations.
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2.4 The RISC-V ISA
RISC-V is an open source Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) ISA pre-
sented in (WATERMAN et al., 2014) and (WATERMAN, 2016). This ISA is divided in
a small base integer ISA, useful for education an research, and an optional extension that
supports applicable software development. Also, the ISA is subdivided in different cat-
egories that may be deployed on 32-, 64-, and even 128-bit architectures, depending on
the requirements and performance/energy trade-offs. While the base ISA is simple and
suitable for education and research, it is efficient enough to be used in low power devices.
Conceptually, the ISA is subdivided in the subsets RV32I/RV32G, RV32E, and
RV64I/RV32G. These categories implement the same instructions and behave similarly,
differing only on the width of the physical registers and the size of the memory space.
RV32E is a variant of RV32I, it implements the same instructions, but contains half the
number of registers, making it suitable for small, power-constrained and energy-efficient
applications. BOOM implements the RV64G ISA variant as its register file consists of
65-bit3 registers.
The RV32I is the most basic and simple variation of RISC-V. It implements 47
instructions, subdivided in system instructions (system calls and performance counters),
computation, control flow, and memory access instructions. The ISA is termed a load/-
store architecture, as only load/store operations can transfer data between the processor
and the memory. The arithmetic and logic instructions operate only on registers.
Both RV32I and RV64I ISAs implement 32 logical registers (x0-x31), 31 of them
are of general-purpose use, and register x0 is hard-wired to the constant zero. Instructions
are fixed 32-bit long, and are classified in computation, control flow, and memory access
instruction, and each of this classes of instruction has a different format.
Each instruction consists at most of one destination and two source registers (i.e.,
computation). Source and destination register specifiers always occupy the same position
in different instructions, regardless of the instruction class. That aspect simplifies the
processor implementation and allows for the register fetch and decode to occur in parallel.
As this dissertation does not intend to be a reference manual on the RISC-V in-
struction set, the following items just shortly illustrate some of the basic aspects of the
ISA instructions, which are classified as:
3BOOM’s physical registers are 65-bit wide because it implements the Berkeley hard float floating point
units which use internal 65-bit operands.
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• Computational Instructions: Comprised of 21 arithmetic, logic, and comparison
instructions. They operate between two integer registers, or between one integer
register and one immediate value, and save the results in a destination register.
Arithmetic operations are addition, subtraction, and bitwise shifts. The logical op-
erations perform bitwise Boolean operation, such as logical AND, OR, and XOR.
Comparison operations perform arithmetic magnitude comparisons between two
sources and write either 0 or 1 values into a destination register depending on the
comparison result.
• Memory Access Instructions: Comprised of load and store instructions. Load in-
structions are divided into five different types that can load a single byte (LB or
LBU), 16-bits (LH or LHU), or 32-bits (LW) from memory into a destination reg-
ister. The ’U’ stands for unsigned. There are three possible store instructions, SW
(for 32-bits), SH (for 16-bits) and SB (for a single byte).
• Control Flow Instructions: Comprised of six conditional branch instructions that
work by comparing the contents of two source registers and then changing the pro-
gram flow in a rage of ±1K instructions. Also, there are two unconditional branch
instructions that may set the program counter to a given address while saving the
address of the next instruction in a destination register, so that it is possible to return
to the address of the instruction fallowing the branch.
• System Instructions: Comprised of eight instructions that can perform system calls,
invoke the debugger and operate on control and status registers (CSR). The current
CSRs hold the values of the cycle counter, real-time clock and number of instruc-
tions retired. These are 64-bit counters, so each of them is implemented as two
32-bit registers and there is a specific instruction to read each of them, yielding six
instructions necessary to access the CSR registers.
Beyond the basic functionalities required by any ISA, RISC-V offers additional exten-
sions that makes the ISA flexible. The extensions are termed "MAFD". M provides
additional instructions that perform integer multiplication and division. A stands for
atomic memory operations useful for synchronization of parallel applications. F stands
for single-precision floating point operations, it adds 30 new instructions to operate on
data movement (load/store), conversions, comparisons, and arithmetic instructions, all of
them operating on floating point data. D stands for double-precision floating point oper-
ations. This extension is similar to the F extension, but operates on 64-bit registers and
new instructions are added to operate on double-precision values.
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When a base integer ISA RV32I/RV64I is extended to handle the MAFD exten-
sion, the extended version of the ISA is termed RV32G/RV64G. Where the abbreviation
G is used for the combination of the base integer ISA plus the MAFD extension (i.e., G is
an alternative for the term IMAFD).
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3 BACKGROUND ON FAULT INJECTION AND RELATED WORK
3.1 Soft Errors and Technology Scaling
Until a few decades ago, most of the concerns with soft errors were related to 1)
space applications, where the levels of radiation-induced faults are high due to cosmic
rays; and 2) alpha particles emitted by radioactive impurities of uranium and thorium
in packaging materials operating at ground level. The latter proved to be the dominant
cause of soft errors in DRAM devices during the 1970s (BAUMANN, 2005). Moreover,
a study in (MAY; WOODS, 1979) discovered that alpha particles imposed significant
contributions to soft errors in dynamic memories, and the soft error rate (SER) was found
out to be proportional to the alpha particle flux.
Regarding space applications, a study in (BINDER; SMITH; HOLMAN, 1975),
for instance, investigated the influence of cosmic rays that caused anomalies on satellites
back in the 70’s. However, due to the technology aggressive scaling, transistors’ sensitiv-
ity to faults tends to increase, and nowadays faults can be experienced even in applications
operating at ground level.
Soft errors are radiation-induced, non-permanent faults which happen due to a par-
ticle hit, e.g., an alpha particle from radioactive decay of impurities in packaging material
or a neutron from cosmic rays (CHANDRA; AITKEN, 2008). When a particle hits the
transistor of the sequential logic of a system, it creates a transient current pulse. If the cur-
rent pulse is large enough, it can flip the value stored in a single element (memory cells,
latches, flip-flops, etc...). These upsets are called Single Event Upsets (SEU) and are the
main contributors to soft errors observed in many of the current technology operating at
ground level (DODD et al., 2010). Furthermore, as the density of transistors in a system
has increased, the distance between sensitive regions, such as memory cells, decreased.
Hence devices containing multiple elements close to each other can experience Multiple
Bit Upsets (MBU), which is defined as any event or series of events that cause more than
one bit to be upset during a single measurement (REED et al., 1997).
As a consequence of this shrinking process, transistors become more sensitive
to soft errors due to the reduction of the critical charge (KARNIK; HAZUCHA, 2004).
Furthermore, even though the soft error susceptibility, mainly SEUs, decreases linearly as
area decreases, it increases exponentially as voltage decreases. So it should be expected
that the voltage reduction that follows the transistors’ size aggressive scaling would cause
39
growth in SEU rates (DIXIT; WOOD, 2011).
Soft errors can affect static random access memories (SRAM), dynamic random
access memory (DRAM), combinational logic and sequential elements in a circuit. Each
of these structures may be vulnerable, and they have different sensitivity levels and their
fault models are considerably different.
A study in (DODD et al., 2010) delineates some trends in memory cells as fea-
tures’ sizes shrink from 200nm to 40nm CMOS technologies. Two main trends can be
identified:
• DRAM’s SER per bit decreases because DRAM’s storage capacitors have not de-
creased significantly. Hence an individual DRAM cell of today’s technology is not
significantly more sensitive than it was generations of technology ago. At the same
time, the cell’s size has indeed shrunk with technology scaling, hence the SER per
bit has decreased since there are more bits per area.
• For SRAMs, the decrease in the charge collection efficiency, which is a measure
of the magnitude of charge generated by a particle strike, has caused growth in
SER per bit with device scaling until the last two or three technology generations.
However, SRAM’s SER appears to be saturated or even became slightly smaller
with 90nm and smaller technologies.
A common method used to report the levels of dependability of a system is based
on the rate at which soft errors occur: the failures in time (FIT) metric tells that 1 FIT cor-
responds to 1 failure in one billion hours. The trends observed in the DRAM and SRAM
memories led their soft error sensitivities to become considerably different. At 90nm
technology, for instance, SRAM and DRAM’s SERs are about 800 and 2 FIT/Mbit, re-
spectively, evidencing that SRAMs are considerably more sensitive than DRAMs (DODD
et al., 2010). Note, however, that this metric relates to the number of failures per bit, and
does not reflect the overall failures observed in today’s memories. As technology shrinks,
the number of bits in memory grows significantly as the bit density increases, hence the
raw failures experienced in SRAMs increases, while the overall number of DRAM’s soft
errors is roughly constant over the years.
Soft errors can also arise from faults in the combinational logic of the circuit when
sufficient radiation induced charges are created in the transistors, these are known as
Single-event transient (SET). If such a glitch propagates to the inputs of a latch or flip-
flop during the latching clock signal, the noise will be stored in the input, and possibly
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will alter the actual correct value that should be stored (BAUMANN, 2005).
Faults in combinational logic can only be observed if the fault hits the cell in
appropriate circumstances, which makes the combinational logic much less susceptible
to soft errors than memory cells (SHIVAKUMAR et al., 2002). This low susceptibility is
justified by three main phenomena that can naturally mask the faults:
1. Logical masking: Occurs when the fault affects an input of a logic gate that will
eventually produce a result that is independent of the faulty input. An example
could be a two-input AND gate, where one of the inputs is set low. If a fault affects
the other input, the result will not be changed, since it is deterministically zero.
2. Electrical masking: Occurs mainly due to the attenuation of the electrical pulse
generated by the particle hit. It is expected that signals propagating from combi-
national logic to a state element tend to be attenuated as it propagates through the
circuits.
3. Latching-window or temporal masking: Occurs when the fault propagates to the
latch in a period of time that is not the period where the latch is supposed to be
written. Note that this masking effect depends on the frequency of operation of the
system.
Even though these three masking factors lead combinational logic to be less sensi-
tive to faults than memory cells, the technology shrinking may eventually attenuate these
masking effects, or even prevent them from happening in some exascale technologies.
The electrical masking caused by attenuation tends to be less effective as the transistors’
size diminishes. Likewise, the voltage reduction allows an increase in the frequency of
operation of the system, which reduces the latching-window time, hence the temporal
masking may be less effective (SHIVAKUMAR et al., 2002). Additionally, more up-to-
date experiments conducted in (MAHATME et al., 2014) and (LI; DRAPER, 2016) con-
cluded that combinational SER is even comparable to the sequential SER with particular
technologies.
Despite SET effects tend to become more and more problematic, in this work we
focus on SEUs since they are still the main contributors to soft errors (SHIVAKUMAR et
al., 2002). More specifically, we focus on SEUs that affect the sequential logic (i.e., the
flip-flops) of BOOM.
As systems are more susceptible to soft errors, fault-tolerant circuits are of increas-
ing importance. Therefore it is necessary to understand the behavior of the system under
41
the presence of faults, so efficient fault-tolerance mechanisms can be devised. One of the
most common and efficient techniques to estimate the fault-tolerance levels of a system
is by means of fault injection, which can be defined as the intentional perturbation of the
elements in a system in order to alter their logical values, while the fault propagation is
observed (HSUEH; TSAI; IYER, 1997).
For low-level evaluations, fault injection techniques usually work by changing the
state of latches, flip-flops or even individual transistors. For higher-level evaluations,
however, it consists in disturbing the state of more abstract elements such as registers,
instructions or the contents of memory addresses.
Fault injection can be traditionally categorized in hardware-, emulation-, simulation-
, and software-based techniques, and each of them can be traded-off in terms of cost,
injection time, precision, and representativeness.
It is important to illustrate both advantages and deficiencies imposed by hardware-
based fault injection, hence evidencing the trade-offs between this method and the simulation-
based ones. This way, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 briefly review hardware-based and simulation-
based fault injection methods, respectively. Some examples of simulation-based fault
injection methods are introduced in Section 3.4
3.2 Hardware-based Fault Injection
Hardware-based fault injection consists in injecting faults directly in the physical
hardware in a pure analog way. It relies on specialized equipment to disturb the hardware
components. This method is traditionally categorized in fault injection with and without
physical contact (HSUEH; TSAI; IYER, 1997), as follows:
• With physical contact: There is a direct physical contact with the system and works
at pin-level. It may either use probes to produce voltage or current disturbances in
the pins or it can work by inserting sockets that force analog signals in the pins that
perturb logic values of the state elements.
• Without physical contact: There is no direct contact with the hardware. External
tools induce heavy-ion radiation into the system, or the system is placed in an elec-
tromagnetic field that causes the fault. This tactic causes spurious currents that
disturb the system.
Hardware-based fault injection becomes expensive since it requires setting up the
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system with dedicated equipment to perform the fault injection and to analyze the behav-
ior of the system under the presence of faults. Also, the setup time it takes to prepare the
system with such equipment should be taken into account, even though it is a one-time
process (ZIADE; AYOUBI; VELAZCO, ). However, it should be mentioned that after the
setup process, running applications and injecting faults in an actual hardware is usually
faster than doing it in a simulator that models the hardware.
Beyond the costs imposed by the specialized equipment, one must consider the
costs and accessibility of the hardware itself. In that sense, the limitations are:
• The hardware is, of course, not available before it is actually implemented, therefore
it is not possible to make early evaluations of the target system. Therefore, in case
hardware structures are found to be fault-sensitive, it would have to be rebuilt from
scratch.
• The hardware may be damaged in the fault injection process, hence becoming use-
less and the costs tend to increase.
Another deficiency of such technique is related to its levels of controllability, ob-
servability, and repeatability. Usually, there is no way to control where the faults are
supposed to be injected with accuracy, mainly when there is no direct contact with the
target system. Hence, any sort of failure cannot be repeated, nor can its behavior be easily
observed. Moreover, one of the most difficult parts of such technique is related to its fault
monitoring and observability because the detection of the fault in the internal structures
of the processor may be really difficult and requires the usage of complex monitoring
hardware (CARREIRA et al., 1998).
Even though the hardware-implemented technique has many shortcomings, it has
some advantages, such as:
• There is a low-level model of the system, so the entire system is exposed to the
tester, meaning that the fault coverage is usually the highest possible.
• It is not intrusive, so the design under test (DUT) does not need to be modified by
any means to perform the faults.
• Experiments are usually fast after the setup process.
• It puts the equipment to work in a situation that resembles the actual environment
the equipment is supposed to be used, so that the evaluation may be realistic.
Since the limitations of the hardware-based fault injection method may be a pro-
hibitive factor, designers can appeal for RTL descriptions (i.e., Verilog or VHDL models)
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of the hardware, which can be used to emulate the hardware behavior at low-level and
with high controllability. This method may work as an emulation-based technique im-
plemented on FPGAs. Unfortunately, such RTL descriptions are frequently intellectual
property and hence are not publicly available. Also, this technique tends to be slower than
the hardware-based one, since the system is simulated at low-level.
3.3 Simulation-based Fault Injection
On account of the restrictions imposed by the hardware- and emulation-based fault
injection methods, some techniques rely on software-based simulators, mostly described
in C/C++ high-level languages, that intend to mimic the behavior of the system in a more
high-level perspective where the low-level structures are not modeled. Good examples
of such tools are the instruction set simulators (ISS). An ISS may be defined as a layer
of software that resides in a host system that enables instructions compiled to one target
architecture that is different from the host architecture to execute in the host (LV et al.,
2008).
An ISS can either work by means of binary translation, such as QEMU (BEL-
LARD, 2005), where the target instructions are translated to the host instructions and
then are executed natively, or they can work by means of interpretation and simulated
execution of the target instructions without explicitly translating them, such as the gem5
simulator (BINKERT et al., 2011).
The main advantages of the simulation-based over the hardware-based strategy
are:
• It is flexible, so it is easy to modify the hardware-models, or even the fault models,
for instance.
• No need for the hardware to be physically implemented, so it is possible to early-
evaluate the system’s reliability with certain accuracy.
• It is highly controllable, so fault location and time can be deterministic.
• It is does not rely on RTL descriptions of the system, which may not be of public
domain.
One of the worst limitations of some high-level simulation-based techniques are
related to their degree of representativeness. Most of these tools only model the hardware
at high-level, which brings difficulties in evaluating the hardware structures with the same
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accuracy provided by RTL models.
The next sections introduce some tools related to simulation-based fault injection.
3.4 Related Work on Fault Injection Tools
Several fault injection platforms for General-purpose Processors (GPPs) and Graphic
Processing Units (GPUs) have been developed on top of different simulators and using
different strategies. This section briefly discusses some of them, pointing out their func-
tionalities, benefits and deficiencies.
3.4.1 DrSEUS - A Dynamic Robust Single-Event Upset Simulator
In (CARLISLE et al., 2016), the authors propose DrSEUs, a fault injector capable
of simulating two types of single event effects (SEE): single event upsets (SEU) and single
event functional interrupts (SEFI).
The tool works coupled with the Simics simulator, which provides functionalities
to save and restore processor checkpoints (the state of the processor in a given cycle).
DrSEUs injects faults in a Freescale’s PowerPC-based processor by modifying
application checkpoint files and loading it into the Simics simulator. Put another way,
DrSEUs does not require any modifications of the design under test (DUT) - neither the
Simics simulator nor the application needs to be modified since the fault injection process
consists basically of modifying checkpoint files by an external tool (the fault injector
itself).
Figure 3.1 depicts architecture of the fault injector. Communication between
Figure 3.1: The DrSEUS fault injector architecture.
Source: (CARLISLE et al., 2016)
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DrSEUs and Simics is done by means of the standard STDIN and STDOUT ports. Also,
a pseudo-terminal that emulates serial communication is used to issue commands and to
monitor the Simics execution. A virtual Ethernet port is implemented in order to send and
receive files to Simics, which includes applications binaries and input/output files.
As a first step, the fault injection campaign collects golden checkpoints in a fault-
free run (the state of the processor in a given cycle where no faults are injected). Then,
the fault is injected by picking a copy of a randomly selected checkpoint and bit-flipping
a random bit of an arbitrary register of it. After that, the mutated checkpoint is loaded into
the Simics simulator, and the simulation starts execution from that checkpoint.
If the application completes execution with no errors, an output file is extracted
from Simics in order to compare it with the golden equivalent file in order to detect fail-
ures.
The main disadvantage is that the Simics is a functional simulator that works at the
instruction level, so it does not provide a low-level perspective of the hardware compo-
nents that could be targeted in a hardware-based fault injection. Therefore fault injections
have to be performed at the architectural level (usually at user-visible registers only) of
the processor components.
3.4.2 OVPSim-FIM
In (ROSA et al., 2015), the authors propose the OVPSim-FIM fault injection plat-
form aiming to evaluate the ARM Cortex-A9, Cortex-A15, and Cortex-M4F processors.
The tool was implemented by coupling a fault injection library to the OVPSim simulator.
The OVPSim-FIM fault injection process can be summarized in five stages:
1. Golden execution: Applications execute in a fault-free mode. No faults are injected
and the final processors state, memory and instructions count is logged.
2. Fault configuration: This phase configures the fault location and time. As the OVP-
Sim simulator is not cycle-accurate, the number of instructions executed is used as
a temporal reference, and the fault time actually tells in which instruction the fault
is supposed to be injected. The fault locations are any randomly chosen register or
memory address, and the fault model is based in a single bit-flip.
3. Error analysis: Compares the results of the fault campaigns with the equivalent
golden execution in order to detect failures. Also, failures are classified in this
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phase.
4. Error report: Reports results created during phase 4.
Since this simulator is not cycle-accurate, the dynamic instruction count was used
as a temporal reference during campaign time, which is considerably coarse-grained.
Also, the simulator models the processor behavior at high-level, and faults can be injected
only on architectural registers and memory.
3.4.3 F-SEFI - Fine-grained Soft Error Fault Injector
In (GUAN et al., 2014), the authors propose F-SEFI, a fault injection tool built
by coupling a fault injection broker (a module) to the QEMU virtual machine. The tool
performs binary injection dynamically.
QEMU works by translating instructions from the guest ISA to the host ISA by us-
ing the Tiny Code Generator (TCG). After the translation phase is complete, the translated
instructions can be executed natively by the host machine. Fault injections are performed
by intercepting instructions and replacing them with faulty instructions during the TCG
translation.
F-SEFI can target instructions in specified functions by benefiting from a binary
symbol table. Also, multiple instances of Guest OS’es can execute in parallel and in an
isolated form, so that different architectures can be evaluated at the same time without
interference. F-SEFI can also target a specific application, hence multiple applications
running in the same Guest OS can be targeted in a controllable manner.
Figure 3.2 depicts the architecture of the platform. The F-SEFI Broker intercepts
selected instructions coming from the Guest OS (the OS being emulated). Faults are
injected in the intercepted translated instruction, then the instruction is executed by the
Figure 3.2: The F-SEFI fault injector architecture.
Source: (GUAN et al., 2014)
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Host Kernel.
The main disadvantage of this strategy is that QEMU works at instruction-level,
hence it can only target specific micro-operations to inject faults. In other words, since
the fault injections are performed in the instructions (at the assembly level), it does not
accurately reflect equivalent hardware fault injections.
3.4.4 MaFIN and GeFIN
In (KALIORAKIS et al., 2015), two different fault injectors, MaFIN and GeFIN
(for MARSS-based and Gem5-based Fault Injector, respectively) are proposed in order
to investigate the propagation of faults in the x86 and ARM ISAs at micro-architectural
level. The work aimed at studying the reliability on different ISAs and reliability studies
on the same ISA on different simulators. Also, both MaFIN and GeFIN support transient,
intermittent and permanent fault models.
Both MaFIN and GeFIN functionalities are depicted in Figure 3.3. The process of
injecting faults consists in:
1. Generating a list of fault masks: In step 1, a list of fault descriptions is generated
in the form of masks. A fault mask consists of the processor core where the fault
is going to be injected, the microarchitecture structure on which the fault will be
injected, the exact bit position of the injection, the exact simulation cycle or exact
instruction on which injection happens (for transient or intermittent), the type of
fault, and the population of faults (single or multiple).
2. Running & Injecting the fault: The Injection Campaign Controller reads fault
masks from the masks repository and sends it to a Injection Dispatcher, which
is the module that communicates directly with the MARSS and Gem5 simulators.
Finally, step 2 retrieves files with the results of the fault injection process and logs
them in the logs repository.
3. Process the results: In step 3, the Parser component takes the log files generated in
step 2 and processes the files in order to detect and classify the faults.
Even though both MaFIN and GeFIN are micro-architectural and detailed simula-
tors, they do not model the system at RTL (i.e., the C++ description of these simulators is
not equivalent to the RTL description of the same system). That implies that these sim-
ulators do not model, for instance, all the intermediate flip-flops found in an equivalent
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Figure 3.3: The MaFIN and GeFIN fault injector architectures.
Source: (KALIORAKIS et al., 2015)
RTL description of the system. Functional units, for example, are not modeled by these
simulators in a way that resembles the actual hardware implementation. Also, these simu-
lators do not model the combinational logic of the processors, meaning that the faults may
not propagate through the components in the same way they would when injecting faults
in a real RTL description. As a consequence, MaFIN and GeFIN can only inject faults
in hardware components that are modeled as arrays, such as the register file, load/store
queues, and caches.
3.4.5 GPU-Qin - A GPU Fault Injector
The methodology developed in (FANG et al., 2016) (the GPU-Qin framework)
aims to evaluate the resiliency of GPGPU applications written in the NVIDIA Compute
Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) and running them on an actual NVIDIA GPU.
CUDA is a standard API (application programming interface) that enables pro-
grammers to use a GPU device as a means for processing big amounts of data in parallel
in a programming model known as single instruction/multiple threads (SIMT). Basically,
this API allows for the programmers to transfer input data from the host CPU to the GPU,
the GPU then splits a kernel C/C++ function into several distinct threads working on the
data in parallel. Once the output is calculated, it is then transferred back to the host CPU.
This model extends the usage of GPUs to general purpose applications, so it is commonly
termed General Purpose Graphics Processing Unit (GPGPU).
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Aiming to evaluate the resiliency of some GPGPU applications, GPU-Qin injects
faults at instruction level using a GPU-based debugger (cuda-gdb), which provides meth-
ods to trace and modify the application at runtime. The injection process consists in three
different phases: Grouping, Profiling and Fault injection. Grouping and Profiling phases
are performed in the GPGPU-Sim GPU simulator, but the applications execute natively
(i.e., in a real GPU hardware) when faults are injected.
Figure 3.4 depicts the fault injection process, and it can be summarized as:
1. Grouping: As the number of threads in GPGPU applications may be too high (often
tens of thousands), it is infeasible to obtain an execution trace for each of the possi-
ble threads. To overcome that, the method used consists in analyzing the behavior
of the application and in separating similar threads in different groups. Threads
are considered similar when they execute a similar number of dynamic instructions.
After the threads are grouped, one thread from each group is selected to obtain the
execution trace.
2. Profiling: This phase consists in mapping the dynamic instructions executed by the
selected threads in the previous phase to their corresponding CUDA source code
line. This is important since the fault injector relies on the cuda-gdb tool, which
needs the source-code line for setting breakpoints along the program flow. The
output of the profiling step is an instruction trace consisting of the program counter
values and the source line associated with each instruction (FANG et al., 2016).
3. Fault injection and monitoring: In this phase, a random thread is selected to inject
the fault. A conditional breakpoint is triggered when the selected thread reaches
a chosen source-code line that corresponds to a randomly selected instruction ob-
tained from the trace from the previous phase. Faults are injected at the instructions
(source or destination registers; or memory addresses) when any breakpoint is trig-
gered. This process is repeated until a significant number of faults are injected.
Since this process works at the assembly level, this technique is useful to assess
the impact of faults only at the architectural state of the GPGPU. Even though the real
hardware is used in the process, cuda-gdb provides access only to a subset of the GPGPU
state, so it is not possible to directly target any specific component of the GPGPU.
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Figure 3.4: GPU-Qin injection process.
Source: Adapted from (FANG et al., 2016)
3.5 Main Contributions of the Proposed Platform
As it was already mentioned, fault injection tools generally have intrinsic charac-
teristics that should be considered when a system’s reliability is to be evaluated. We point
out six primitives that should be considered:
1. Representativeness: How accurately is the system modeled? Is there a real hard-
ware? If not, how accurately is the hardware modeled?
2. Controllability: What is the level of controllability of the fault injection? Can one
choose where/when faults should be injected?
3. Accessibility: Is there an available model of the system in which faults can be
injected? Is there a real hardware? Is there an available simulator or an HDL
description of the system?
4. Cost: Is there additional costs to inject faults into the system? Or is it for free?
5. Synthesizability: Can the system be synthesized?
6. Performance: How many faults can be injected per second?
The main problem statement of this work is based on the fact that there is a trade-
off between hardware-based techniques and methods based on high-level simulators. For
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both techniques, the items (1)-(6) are never provided altogether (ARLAT et al., 2003).
However, the main goal of this work aimed to implement a fault injection tool for a super-
scalar processor that is controllable and cheap, while working at RTL. This aspect requires
that such a tool inherits both the levels of representativity of a hardware (to some extent)
and the levels of controllability of a simulator implemented in software. Moreover, as
some techniques may or may not allow the physical implementation of the system, the
synthesizability is an important aspect to be considered.
Note that, although our platform works at RTL, it is not as representative as the
real hardware because it does model the electrical characteristics, voltages, features’ sizes
and propagation delays between gates, for example. However, since in this work we are
interested only on SEUs, working with a simulator at RTL is arguably accurate and fault
injections in this model may be considered similar to fault injection in the real hardware.
By similar, we mean that the SEUs tend to propagate through the simulated processor
in an analogous way they would propagate in the real hardware if no electrical events
masked the fault. On the other hand, if the phenomenon to be investigated are MBUs,
for example, then our tool would lack the physical model of the characteristics of the
hardware that influence the propagations of MBUs, because these events depend on the
actual distances between gates and latches and the frequency of operation, for example.
Table 3.1 compares the items listed in (1)-(6) for each of the fault injection meth-
ods considered. The symbols ’+’, ’++’, ’-’, and ’- -’ represent the different "intensities"
for each of the characteristics listed in the table. For the hardware-based method, the ’- -’
symbol means it has really poor performance, while the ’++’ symbol means it is strongly
representative, for example. Note how our tool meets the criteria of a really sophisti-
cated fault injection tool, because it fits in one of the best possibilities (i.e., it is accurate,
controllable, available and cheap, etc...).
Table 3.1: Comparison between hardware-based, simulation-based, and the proposed
fault injection tool.
Feature Hardware-based High-level simulator-based Proposed tool
Representativeness ++ - +
Controllability - + +
Accessibility - + +
Cost + - -
Synthesizability + - +
Performance - - ++ +
Source: Author
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In order to highlight the main accomplishments of our platform, we explain Table
3.1 as follows:
• Hardware-based: Even though it has good representativeness, it is usually expen-
sive due to the infrastructure necessary to inject faults and has poor performance
(bad). Also, the acquisition of a hardware is often both difficult and expensive (also
bad).
• High-level simulator-based: It is highly controllable and has the best performance
among all methods (good), but the levels of representativeness may vary consider-
ably as some simulators may be purely functional (bad), while others may model
the micro-architectural level of the system, but not at RTL (so-so).
• Proposed tool: Models the system at RTL (good), hence its performance tends to
suffer (bad). It is based on a software simulator, so it is controllable (good). It is
available (good). It is for free (good).
As a final note, it is important to mention that the availability of such a platform
is only possible because there is a 1:1 correspondence between the Verilog description of
BOOM and its simulator, which is automatically generated by the build tools we benefit
from (Chisel itself). Therefore, another notable aspect that boosts our platform one step
ahead of the high-level simulators is that, as Chisel generates Verilog, the BOOM pro-
cessor can actually be physically synthesized or programmed in an FPGA, while other
popular high-level simulators, such as gem5, are restricted to work only in software.
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4 A PLATFORM TO EVALUATE THE BOOM’S SENSITIVITY TO FAULTS
As it can be noted from the previous sections, there are several methodologies
and tools developed in the area of resilience evaluation. However, the most important
aspect to be learned is that there is a trade-off between the hardware- and simulation-
based techniques. In short, this trade-off can be summarized as:
1. The hardware-based technique, in some cases, is not plausible mainly due to its
poor accessibility, high costs and lack of controllability. But since it uses the real
hardware, it does not rely on high-level methods that could provide non-realistic
evaluations (i.e., it has good representativeness).
2. The techniques based on high-level simulators are not as detailed as the hardware
they intend to model, hence it may provide poor representativeness. In other words,
injecting faults in such simulators may not resemble fault injections in the real hard-
ware. But it comes at low-cost and experiments are often controllable.
Besides the trade-off between (1) and (2), it is important to mention that there is
a lack of open-source tools that evaluate the resilience to faults of superscalar processors
at low-level. In fact, none of the tools studied over the course of this work allows for the
resilience evaluation of such complex systems at RTL.
Therefore, we developed a fault injection platform that trades off the shortcomings
imposed by the fault injection techniques discussed so far. The development of the tool
works by leveraging the BOOM’s simulator infrastructure in a way that faults can be
injected in the registers of the processor.
The next sections describe how the platform to evaluate the sensitivity of the
BOOM processor was implemented and how the process of injecting faults is performed.
4.1 Platform Overview
The basic foundation of the proposed fault injector is the BOOM’s simulator RTL
infrastructure. Recall that, since BOOM is developed in Chisel, we benefit from an auto-
matically generated C++ simulator that packs all of the processor state and behavior. The
adopted approach to implement the platform was to couple a fault injection module to the
BOOM’s C++-exported simulator. Figure 4.1 shows the build process of the platform.
The C++ exported simulator is highly detailed, meaning that the complete proces-
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Figure 4.1: Build process of the fault injection platform.
Source: Author
sor state is accessible in the simulator’s internal behavior, i.e., for each bit in BOOM’s
Verilog representation, there is an equivalent bit in the C++ simulator. This feature is
the core and fundamental idea behind our tool because it bridges the gap between the
hardware and simulation-based traditional fault injection tools by providing access to the
processor at RTL by means of a cycle-accurate simulator.
First, the BOOM’s Chisel source code is compiled, and the equivalent C++ simu-
lator is generated, as shown in the Chisel’s work part on the left side of the figure. After
the BOOM’s C++ source code is available, an external tool (the RegExporter) scans this
source code looking for variables that represent each of the registers of the processor (i.e.,
all sequential components). The registers are filtered by their respective variable names
and are grouped according to their functionalities in the processor (e.g., registers in the
RF or ROB). As an outcome, several other C++ source files that enable the access to
any of the registers of the processor are grouped into bundles of registers. Once these
new automatically generated source files are exported by the RegExporter tool, they are
then compiled and linked together to form the RegisterBase component. This process is
illustrated in the Our work side of the figure.
The framework can be seen as a tool composed roughly of 6 different components:
• BOOMlib: It is the library compiled from the C++ exported source code that mod-
els the processor’s behavior in a cycle-accurate way. This library consists of the
entire processor state and behavior. All of the processor’s registers and behavior
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will be encapsulated inside a single C++ top class termed Top_t, which holds the
clock_lo() and clock_hi() methods for the BOOM’s combinational and sequential
behavior.
• AppProfiler: Collects fault-free information about the application, which is the first
step in the fault campaign. It works by running the benchmark and storing some
information such as the final virtual memory state (namely, the golden memory)
and the number of cycles executed by the application (golden cycles). The golden
memory is the correct result provided by the processor.
• RegisterBase: Consisted of an array of pointers to the registers of the processor.
During the framework’s build process, the C++ BOOM’s source code is scanned by
an external tool (the RegExporter), and the registers are exported from it, forming
new source codes with methods to push the registers’ addresses to an array. At
runtime, registers are grouped according to their functionalities (see Figure 4.1).
For instance, there is a method responsible for pushing all of the address of the RF’s
registers to the array in a proper file, while the addresses of the ROB’s registers are
pushed by a method in another file. At runtime, the fault injection module can target
any of these registers. This component is also used to save and restore the processor
state so that our tool can afford a checkpointing mechanism.
• CheckpointingMgr: The checkpointing manager accelerates the fault injection
campaigns by fast forwarding and early stopping the application execution.
• Saboteur: Responsible for injecting faults in the processor. It basically consists of
a structure that defines the fault model and a pointer to the RegisterBase component.
As transient faults are supported, this module works by injecting a single bit-flip in
a random cycle in any arbitrary register during the application execution.
• Logger: Compares the final memory state to the golden memory in order to detect
failures and logs the results in a status file.
Beyond the fault injection modules, the platform was also enhanced with an in-
struction and performance monitor module. This component allows the analysis of the
instruction trace and provides a profile of the instruction mix executed by the workload.
Also, this module provides the IPC metric of the application. This is useful since it pro-
vides the characterization of the workload, which may reflect in the fault sensitivity of the
hardware structures.
More implementation details for the modules will be discussed in Section 4.3, but
56
first, it is important to have a basic understating of the overall fault injection process,
discussed in the next section.
4.2 Fault Injection Process
4.2.1 The Fault Injection Life Cycle
Our framework supports two different modes of operation: fault-free and faulty
mode. In the fault-free mode, no faults are injected, and it is used to collect golden
checkpoints and to profile the application. Application profiling works by collecting the
contents of the main memory and the number of cycles taken by the application to be exe-
cuted. That must be the first step of the fault injection campaigns, as shown in Figure 4.2.
The checkpointing mechanism works by saving and restoring the state of the registers,
caches, and memory considering a given interval between them. Note that the step Profile
application & Collect checkpoints is a one-time process, hence can be skipped for future
campaigns.
Once the fault-free mode is complete and all the necessary checkpoints are col-
lected, the faulty mode starts, when the actual faults are injected in the processor.
The faulty mode is the framework’s bottleneck in terms of execution time since the
simulator is supposed to run for several times in this mode, as thousands of faults have to
Figure 4.2: The fault injection life cycle.
Source: Author
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Figure 4.3: The checkpointing mechanism - the application is first fast-forwarded to
Cprev, and it may be halted in any Cpost in case the fault is masked.
Source: Author
be injected. Therefore, performance becomes of crucial importance, and the checkpoint-
ing mechanism is used to achieve better performance.
As shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, the checkpointing mechanism works in two dis-
tinct ways: it either fast-forwards the application and, lately, it early-stops the execution
in case the fault is masked. This idea is similar to the strategies adopted in (CHATZIDIM-
ITRIOU; GIZOPOULOS, 2016) and (CARLISLE et al., 2016). In short, this mechanism
works as follow:
1. Since the processor’s execution and state before the fault is injected is of no im-
portance, it can be skipped without any loss of information. The checkpointing
manager fast forwards the application execution to the nearest checkpoint available
right before the fault injection cycle (the Cprev checkpoint).
2. The checkpointing manager early stops the application execution: After the fault is
injected, it is possible that the faulty register is overwritten before it is read, prevent-
ing the fault from propagating to other hardware components. This masking effect
can be detected in any post-fault checkpoint by comparing the state of the processor
to its corresponding golden state. In case the fault is masked, the application can
be halted since we know it will not lead to any failure. For empirical reasons, the
early stop is handled by comparing a maximum of five checkpoints, which are the
next four available checkpoints right after the fault cycle and, lastly, the checkpoint
located right in half of the remaining application execution. These are called the
Cpost checkpoints, depicted in Figure 4.3.
More details of the checkpointing mechanism will be given in Section 4.3.3.
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4.2.2 Fault Classification
Once the simulator starts running the faulty mode and the fault is injected, the
behavior of the simulation becomes unpredictable (e.g., it may crash). When the simula-
tion ends execution, and if it was not early-stopped, and no timeouts or crash occurred,
then the contents of the final memory state are compared with the contents of the golden
memory in order to detect failures. The fault can be either considered masked, or it can
manifest as a failure.
In short, the simulation outcomes may be summarized as:
• Masked fault: The faulty register is never used, or it is overwritten before it is
read and hence the fault cannot propagate. In this scenario, the final contents of the
memory are identical to the contents of the golden memory, hence no failures can
be detected.
• Silent Data Corruption (SDC): The injected fault is not masked and propagates
through the processor causing the final memory state to be different from the golden
memory, and it cannot be detected during the application execution by any means,
hence the term silent.
• Timeout: The faulty register causes the processor to enter into a hang state. To
avoid running the application indefinitely, it stops executing when the number of
executed cycles reaches twice the golden cycles.
• Crash: The injected fault causes segmentation-fault in the simulator. It happens
mainly when the processor tries to access invalid/corrupted memory addresses.
4.3 Platform Infrastructure
4.3.1 The BOOMlib Component
As explained in Section 2.3, the behavior of any C++ simulator exported from
Chisel consists in instantiating an object-module of the exported class that models the
hardware, then invoking the clock_lo() and clock_hi() primitives in order to update the
combinational and sequential state of the system, respectively.
In that sense, the BOOMlib component is a library that holds the necessary code
to mimic the BOOM processor. More specifically, when the Chisel description is trans-
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Figure 4.4: Example of a C++ simulator exported from Chisel.
Source: Author
formed into C++, the processor state will be exported to a Top_t class, and all of the
registers of the processor will be found as objects declared inside this class along with
the processor behavior that will be modeled by the clock_lo() and clock_hi() methods. In
order to simulate the SoC, it is necessary to instantiate an object of the Top_t class, and to
invoke the clock_lo() andclock_hi() methods appropriately.
Figure 4.4 shows, in a really high-level perspective, an example usage of the
BOOM simulator. The basic functionality is straightforward: an instance of the SoC
is instantiated, then the program is loaded to an emulated virtual memory system that is
connected to the SoC and the simulation enters a loop that starts invoking the clock_lo()
and clock_hi() methods to update the processor state, while the memory is ticked. For
each sequence of execution of clock_lo() and clock_hi() methods, one clock cycle is ad-
vanced. For BOOM, the simulation will stop executing when a trap (an instruction) writes
a proper value to a control and status register (CSR) of the processor.
Note that the only code that is exported from Chisel to C++ is the Top_t class,
which contains the clock_lo() and clock_hi() methods, and the registers and caches, while
the code illustrated in the Figure 4.4 is handwritten, and its role is to instantiate the SoC
in order to simulate it.
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4.3.2 The RegisterBase Component
The RegisterBase component is simply a library composed of an array that holds
the addresses of the processor’s registers. It is constructed by the RegExporter external
application tool, which is is a Java-based application that filters each of the registers by
taking a substring of their variable names as an input filter. It then emits corresponding
source codes for each group of registers, as in Figure 4.5.
As already stated, the BOOM’s compilation flow consists in transforming the
Chisel source code into an equivalent C++ description. After the C++ source code is
generated, the RegExporter tool takes such source codes as an input and extracts the reg-
isters (represented as variables inside the code) from the source files. Extraction, in this
context, means that new source codes are automatically generated by the tool. These new
generated C++ source codes contain methods that push the addresses of the variables that
represent each register to an array, as shown on the bottom part of Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Register extraction and grouping by the RegExporter tool - the new generated
source files form the RegisterBase component.
Source: Author
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Fault injections and the checkpointing mechanism consist in operating on this ar-
ray of registers. Whenever required, the array is loaded with the adequate register group
by invoking the proper method (e.g., load_registers_rf() will fill the array with the RF
registers’ addresses). After the array is filled up, the operation on it is performed. After
the operation is done, the array is freed to make room for other registers whenever needed.
An implementation-level view of the BOOM processor is depicted in Figure 4.5
(on the top left corner) in order to illustrate the functionality of the RegExporter. For
simplicity, the figure only illustrates how the groups RF, IU, and ROB are filtered by their
corresponding names. The filter is highlighted in blue as a substring of the variable’s
name.
Recall from section 2.2.1 that the BOOM processor is instantiated inside the Rocket
Chip SoC generator. Also, recall from section 2.3 that the Chisel → C++ code trans-
formation preserves the order of the variable names, while organizing them in a topo-
logical manner. For example, in the C++ BOOM’s source codes in Figure 4.5, the
Top_BOOMTile_core_regfile__regfile_0 variable is an object that represents a register in
the processor. This name was preserved when it was transformed from Chisel to C++,
and this object holds the actual value of the register.
The name of such variable suggests that the Top prefix represents the top mod-
ule described in Chisel that instantiates the SoC itself. The SoC, in turn, instantiates the
BOOM processor core inside it, represented by the BOOMTile_core substring. The regis-
ter file is placed, obviously, inside of the core, so that the regfile__ substring represents the
instance of the whole physical register file module, and the attached regfile_0 substring
represents the register of index 0 inside the register file, which holds the actual 65-bit
value of a single register in the BOOM’s RF. The same analysis may be conducted for all
of the registers present in BOOM.
When Chisel is transformed into C++, all of the variables/objects that represent
registers are encapsulated inside a single class, and an instance of this class represents the
main module of the described hardware. Inside of this class, each register is instantiated
as an object. In this scenario, the tile object in Figure 4.5 is an instance of the main class
that instantiates the SoC, which includes the BOOM processor. More precisely, the entire
SoC is instantiated by the tile object, and all of the operations on the BOOM processor
must manipulate the objects inside the tile instance.
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4.3.3 The Checkpointing Manager Component
The CheckpointingMgr (checkpointing manager) component handles the applica-
tion checkpointing by saving and restoring the contents of registers, caches, and virtual
memory in a given cycle. If the context of the processor is available in any given cycle,
the application execution may be latter resumed to that cycle.
For the proposed platform, checkpointing is used to speed up the fault injection
campaigns by both restoring the application context to the nearest cycle before the fault
injection cycle and by early-stopping the application, if possible, after the fault injection
cycle in case the fault is masked.
In the BOOM simulator, each register is represented by means of a unique variable
(i.e., there is one variable for each register). Recall that, for the purpose of injecting faults
in the processor, all of the registers were first collected and grouped in the RegisterBase
component according to categories (e.g., RF, ROB, EXE, IU, etc...).
The process of saving the context (or state) of the processor works simply by
saving the contents of each register (also memory and caches) in the desired cycle in an
appropriate file. For each array of registers (i.e, for each register group), a binary file will
hold, sequentially, the contents the registers contained in it. In this architecture, a different
file is required to save the state of registers (which also includes the caches) and memory,
Figure 4.6: Saving/restoring the state of the processor for the SHA application in cycle
500.
Source: Author
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and for the same application, a different file is created for each desired cycle the context
is supposed to be saved in. For this reason, the contents of registers and the memory are
saved in files whose names are patterned as follows: ApplicationName_reg_Cycle.dat, for
registers and caches; and ApplicationName_mem_Cycle.dat for the memory.
As an example, Figure 4.6 illustrates the process of saving/restoring the processor
context in cycle 500 while running the SHA application. Consider that each of the vertical
gray "cells" represents a single register; in our framework, the whole "pile" of cells is
stored in an array of registers. Note that, for simplicity, the figure only depicts the RF,
ROB, BPU, CSR and the Issue Window register groups (and also memory and caches),
but the checkpointing mechanism actually saves all of the register groups.
In order to save the processor’s context, for each group of registers, an array is first
loaded with all of the required addresses of such registers that are pulled from the Regis-
terBase component, which also includes the caches’ contents. After that, the contents of
the array are written sequentially to the file. For later recovery of the context, the array
has just to be read from the file in the same order it was written. As the memory of the
Figure 4.7: Saving/restoring the processor state for the SHA application.
(a) In cycle 500, the checkpoint is created by writing the processor’s state to proper files.
(b) In cycle 500, the processor’s state is restored by reading it from the proper files.
Source: Author
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processor is simply represented by a vector, the process of saving and restoring its context
is straightforward.
After processor state is saved, all of the checkpoint files will be found in a folder
located in the simulation directory. More precisely, for each application, there will be two
different files for each cycle the checkpoint was saved in, as shown in Figure 4.6. The
application’s context may be lately restored to a required cycle by reading the values of
each register and memory content that are read from the associate file.
Another checkpointing example is depicted in Figure 4.7 in order to give a more
consistent and generic example of how the application context is saved and restored. How-
ever, in this case, consider that the gray vectors represent the whole processor state and
memory (again, just for simplicity).
Suppose, for instance, that the processor’s context must be saved in cycle 500 for
the SHA application. First, the program is loaded into the memory and the simulator
starts at cycle 0. When the simulation reaches cycle 500, the application halts, then the
CheckpointingMgr component saves the state of each of register, caches, and memory.
After the files are saved, the application resumes the execution right from the point it
stopped. This process is illustrated in Figure 4.7a.
In a future execution of SHA, if the state of the processor before cycle 500 is of no
interest, the state of the processor may be restored from the appropriate checkpoint files
by passing the cycle of interest as an argument to the simulator. The process of restoring
the context of the processor to a given cycle is called fast-forwarding, and it is depicted
in Figure 4.7b.
The CheckpointingMgr provides a considerable speedup for the fault injection
campaigns by restoring the processor context to the proper cycle. Moreover, as will be
described in the next section, this component is also used to stop the application execution
when faults injected in the processor are masked.
4.3.4 The Saboteur Component
The proposed fault injection platform aims to inject a single bit flip (an SEU) in a
random bit of any arbitrary register of the BOOM processor. For that matter, the Saboteur
component was implemented and coupled with the BOOM simulator. This component
basically consists of a pointer to the RegisterBase component, which enables the access
to all of the registers contained in it.
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Figure 4.8: Generating checkpoints and profiling the application.
Source: Author
The fault injection process is simple, and it works as follows:
1. Generate a cycle in which the fault is supposed to be injected.
2. Randomly select a register in the processor from the RegisterBase component.
3. Generate a random index (ri) that represents the bit supposed to be flipped in that
register.
4. Using the random bit index, generate a fault mask in which only the ri-bit is ’1’,
and all other bits are ’0’.
5. When the fault cycle is reached, operate an exclusive-or (XOR) operation between
the value of the register and the fault mask.
6. Monitor the state of the processor. If the fault is masked in any Cpost cycle, halt
the simulation.
Before any fault injection campaign starts, a golden run is necessary in order to
collect fault-free information about the application, such as the final contents of the mem-
ory and the number of executed cycles by the application. Also, it is worth collecting
golden checkpoints in a regular interval along the application flow in order to feed the
checkpointing mechanism and speedup future fault injection campaigns. The AppProfiler
component handles such profiling and it is depicted in Figure 4.8. After the profiling is
complete, there will be a golden memory file for the application that will be used by the
Logger component in order to detect failures in future fault injection campaigns.
As we benefit from a checkpointing mechanism, it is convenient to generate many
checkpoints for an application in a regular cycle interval. Once all the checkpoints are
collected and the application profiling is complete, the faulty simulation starts. After
the cycle in which the fault will be injected is generated, the state of the processor can
be fast-forwarded to the nearest available checkpoint before the fault cycle (the Cprev
checkpoint).
As an example, suppose that the SHA application is executing, and a fault is sup-
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Figure 4.9: Fast-forwarding to the cycle 500 and fault injection in cycle 730.
(a) After fault configuration, the processor is fast-forwarded to cycle 500
and keeps executing.
(b) A single bit is flipped when the simulation reaches the fault cycle.
(c) In a Cpost checkpoint, the simulation is early stopped in
case the fault is masked, otherwise it keeps running.
Source: Author
posed to be injected in the processor in a random cycle, for instance, cycle 730 (see Figure
4.9). Just in case there is an available checkpoint for this application before cycle 730,
e.g., cycle 500, then the processor state can be fast-forwarded straight to that cycle, and
the time that would be spent to execute 500 cycles is saved.
After the fault is injected, it is naturally possible that the fault becomes masked
due to the program flow (i.e., application masking), and since there are checkpoints at
regular intervals after the fault injection cycle, the current state of the processor may be
compared to the state of such checkpoints (the Cpost checkpoints), which are fault-free.
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By performing such comparison it is possible to detect whether the fault was
masked (if the current state of the processor is identical to the checkpoint state) or not. Re-
call that the checkpoint files contain the entire state of the processor (registers, caches and
memory), hence if the current state of the processor is identical to an equivalent fault-free
checkpoint in a given cycle, the fault is guaranteed to be masked. Therefore, in this case,
the application may be aborted since it is known beforehand the fault will not manifest as
a failure, hence even more execution time is saved.
Figure 4.9 depicts the complete scenario of a single fault injection being helped
by the checkpointing strategy. Each separate figure may be explained as follows:
• Figure 4.9a: First, the simulator starts and the program is loaded into the memory.
After that, the Fault Setup process randomly generates the faulty cycle and the
register the fault is supposed to be injected. As the generated fault cycle is 730, the
application is fast forwarded to cycle 500 and then it executes the remaining 230
cycles until it reaches cycle 730.
• Figure 4.9b: When the application reaches the fault cycle (730), an SEU is injected
in the randomly selected register, then it resumes the execution.
• Figure 4.9c: When any Cpost is reached, the state of the processor is compared to its
equivalent golden state. If the fault is masked in this cycle, then the simulation stops
executing and campaign time is saved. If the fault is still present, however, the sim-
ulation must keep running. Acknowledge that, in our experiments, the maximum
number of Cposts that will be compared is five. One could consider comparing even
more checkpoints in order to check if the simulation can be early-stopped, but have
in mind that comparing checkpoints implies in an overhead, hence there is a trade-
off between the time to compare a certain number of checkpoints and the number
of early-stopped simulations.
4.3.5 The Logger Component
For each fault to be injected, there will be one instance of the simulator process.
More specifically, when a fault injection is to be performed, the process of the simulator
starts, then it simulates the execution of an application and injects the fault and, when
the simulation ends, the Logger component compares the final state of the processor’s
memory (which we call the Work memory) to the golden memory state.
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Figure 4.10: Workflow for the Logger component.
Source: Author
The Logger will then update a status file for the executed application. This file
holds information about the fault injection. More specifically, the file contains vectors of
counters for each of the possible outcomes of the fault injection campaign.
As several fault injections must be performed, the status files must accumulate the
results for each application. Thus, after the simulation ends and the two memories are
compared, a status structure is first read from the proper file to retrieve the results from
previous fault injections, the structure is then updated (i.e., its counters are incremented)
and the results are written back to the same file. This process is depicted in Figure 4.10.
Each position in the vector of counters is bound to a specific hardware component
where faults can be injected, hence there are currently six positions (for the RF, ISSUE,
RENAME, EXE , BPU, and ROB). As an example, when a fault is injected in the RF, and
it leads to an SDC, then the command stats→counter_sdc[RF_ID]++ will increment the
number of SDCs caused by faults injected in the RF component.
After several faults are injected, the status file of an application should be pro-
cessed by a proper application in order to get the statistics about the whole fault injection
campaign. Basically, it only consists of reading the stats structure from the binary file.
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4.3.6 The BOOMulator Component
Note that we have described the individual functionalities of each module as a sep-
arate unit. In order to use the simulator, it is necessary an instance of the simulator that
contains, uses and coordinates the usage of such components. This way, the BOOMulator
component is a class that holds these different components inside of it. In order to execute
the simulator, an instance of the BOOMulator can be declared inside of the main() func-
tion, for example, and after that, this object must invoke the routines that actually execute
the simulation by triggering the clock_lo() and clock_high() methods.
This idea is illustrated in Figure 4.11. Note that there can be different instances
of the simulator, since both faulty and fault-free simulations are supported. After the
application ends a faulty execution, the Logger component processes the output generated
by BOOM. Also, when the simulation ends a fault-free execution and the user wants to
record the golden profile of the application, then the AppProfiler will save the BOOM’s
final memory state and the number of cycles taken by the application.
Figure 4.12 shows in a high-level perspective the infrastructure of the simulator.
Have in mind, however, that the figure is not the complete UML representation of the
platform at all, since its role is merely illustrative. However, some insights about the plat-
form are given, which should be self-explanatory. Note how the BOOMulator "contains"
a Top_t member object that represents the SoC. This way, the processor is simulated when
Figure 4.11: An example usage of the BOOMulator.
Source: Author
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Figure 4.12: High-level view of the simulator infrastructure.
Source: Author
a BOOMulator object triggers the run() method, which in turn invokes the clock_lo() and
clock_hi() primitives of the Chisel-exported Top_t class.
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5 RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF BOOM
Authors in (CZECK; SIEWIOREK, 1992) showed that the behavior of a proces-
sor when faults are injected in it depends not only on the fault location, but also on the
application being executed. Therefore, resilience evaluations should be performed by
executing applications commonly used by the general public. One of the most popular
workloads to fulfill this requirement is MiBench (GUTHAUS et al., 2001). MiBench en-
compasses different application domains such as communication, industry, and security.
That justifies the use of such suite in the fault injection campaigns.
In order to validate our fault injection tool, the following MiBench workloads were
used:
• SHA: The secure hash algorithm takes 512-bit input blocks and produces a 160-bit
message digest as an output. It is often used in the secure exchange of cryptographic
keys and for generating digital signatures. Also, it is used in data integrity by using
the message digest of the transmitted data as verification mechanism.
• CRC32: Used in error detection for data transmission. It works by calculating a 32-
bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC), or checksum, on the transmitted data. The
checksum is calculated based on the remainder of a polynomial division of the data
values, and is attached to the transmitted data before the data is transmitted.
• String search: Algorithm that searches a given string in a set of strings or text.
• FFT: Computes the Fast Fourier Transform on a sampled input signal. It delivers
the different frequencies with their respective amplitudes contained in the signal.
The FFT algorithm has a wide range of applications in signal processing, telecom-
munication, and several other fields.
• Quicksort: An efficient algorithm used for sorting an array of arbitrary types of
data.
• Dijkstra: Computes the shortest path between two nodes in a graph. A graph is
implemented as an adjacency matrix, then the algorithm calculates the shortest path
between every pair of nodes using repeated executions of Dijkstra’s algorithm. This
algorithm is mostly used in computer networking, mainly in routing systems.
• Rijndael (encrypt): A symmetric cryptographic algorithm also known as Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES). The encrypt algorithm takes a plaintext (input data to
be encrypted) and a secret key as input and produces a ciphertext output (output
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encrypted data). This algorithm is highly used in network security.
Two types of results are presented in the next sections: the speedup the check-
pointing mechanism provided, presented in the next Section, and the fault sensitivity and
characterization of the BOOM processor, presented in Section 5.2.
5.1 Speeding up Fault Injection Campaigns with Checkpointing
The more faults are injected in a processor, the more reliable its characterization
to faults become. Speeding up application execution comes at no cost and has advantages
since it necessarily implies in faster fault injection campaigns, which means that more
faults can be injected in the same amount of time. Also, fault tolerance techniques such as
instruction redundancy imply in a considerable overhead, so speeding up the application
execution in this scenario can provide an even more significant performance improvement.
We investigated the speedup our checkpointing mechanism can yield for the single-
issue version of the BOOM processor by running some MiBench applications in the fol-
lowing distinct cases:
1. No fast forwarding and no early stopping: the checkpointing mechanism is not
used.
2. Early stopping only: It is early stopped, but not fast forwarded.
3. Fast forwarding only: It is fast forwarded, but not early stopped.
4. Fast forwarding & early stopping: The best case - the application is either fast
forwarded and early stopped whenever possible.
Table 5.1 depicts the average execution time, in seconds, for the 7 benchmarks
executed in the four modes of operation. For each application, 1,000 faults were injected
(hence 7,000 executions) for each of the four cases, totalizing 28,000 fault injections.
Table 5.1: Faults per second (FPS) achieved, on average, and speedup for the four cases.
Fast Forward/Early Stop Seconds Taken FPS Speedup
OFF/OFF 14979 0.46 N/A
OFF/ON 9688 0.72 1.54
ON/OFF 7290 0.96 2.0
ON/ON 3539 1.98 4.3
Source: Author
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The time for profiling the application and saving the checkpoints is also considered in the
table, but it tends to be amortized since this is a one-time process.
Column 4 shows the average speedup achieved when comparing the underlying
faults per second to the case 1, where no checkpoints are used (the worst case). As can be
noted, fast forwarding the application has more effect than early stopping it. That is due to
the fault injection effects that sometimes prevent the application from being early stopped.
When the application is both fast forwarded and early stopped, a speedup of up to 4.3 was
reached. The faults per second metric depends upon the checkpoint interval (500 cycles
in this case) and, of course, the performance of the machine running the fault campaigns.
In this case, an Intel I7-860 with four cores @ 2.8 GHz with 16GB of memory.
5.2 Processor Sensitivity Analysis
This section presents the results obtained from the validation tests of the fault in-
jection platform. The platform was explored and validated by injecting faults in three
versions of BOOM. Also, the level of controllability of the platform was tested by selec-
tively injecting faults in particular areas of the processors in a cycle-accurate manner.
As reliability is a fundamental concern of today’s processors, it may be really
important to measure/estimate which of the main components are the most sensitive to
faults. In other words, it is important to characterize the processor’s sensitivity to faults by
analyzing its behavior when faults are injected into it. If such metrics are available during
the implementation phase, for example, then protection mechanisms could be devised in
order to protect the most sensitive components, thus the final product would be a more
error-resilient processor by benefiting from fault detection and fault removal mechanisms.
As the validation of the fault injection platform is essential, fault injections were
performed in three different versions of the BOOM processor, and the results are dis-
cussed in this chapter. The experiments presented here illustrate how fault injections can
be performed in particular chosen areas of the processors. Also, this section illustrates
how the processor sensitivity is influenced by some application characteristics.
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, BOOM is constituted of six major hardware struc-
tures:
1. RF: The physical register file.
2. RENAME: Register renaming circuitry.
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Table 5.2: Number of flip-flops in each structure.
Flip-flops Single-issue Dual-issue Quad-issue
RF 6500 7150 8320
RENAME 3285 5933 6149
IU 4897 8342 11792
EXE 20597 32492 49937
BPU 1557 1638 2257
ROB 11865 22151 56583
Source: Author
3. ISSUE: Instruction issue logic unit, including the instruction window.
4. EXE: Execution units, bypass network, and load/store queues.
5. BPU: Branch prediction unit, including branch target buffer (BTB), branch history
table (BHT), and return address stack (RAS).
6. ROB: The reorder buffer.
In order to validate our platform and to estimate the sensitivity to faults of the
BOOM processor, fault injections were performed in the registers that compose the hard-
ware structures listed in (1)-(6), which also include all of the sequential logic related to
these structures (i.e., it includes all of the interconnections in between these structures).
As an outcome, it provided a characterization of the BOOM’s sensitivity to faults.
The results provide an estimate of which are the most sensitive components and
how much sensitive the components are when executing a given workload. Moreover,
the sensitivities of different processors were estimated and compared. Three processor
configurations were evaluated: single-, dual-, and quad-issue. Results show that the levels
of sensitivity for the three processors are significantly different. Also, there is a direct
correspondence between the components’ sensitivities and applications characteristics.
As three different processors are evaluated, it is important to have in mind that the
structure sizes for each component of the processors vary. The number of flip-flops for
each item in (1)-(6) is depicted in Table 5.2. The main structures’ sizes for each of the
Table 5.3: Configured sizes for the main components.
Feature sizes Single-issue Dual-issue Quad-issue
Physical registers in the RF 100 110 128
ROB entries 24 48 128
Issue window entries 12 20 28
LSU entries 8 16 32
Source: Author
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Table 5.4: Configured Execute Units.
Core Execute Unit ALU FPU iMul iDiv LSU
Single-issue EU#0 x x x x x
Dual-issue EU#0 x x x
EU#1 x x x
Quad-issue EU#0 x
EU#1 x x x
EU#2 x x
EU#3 x
Source: Author
experimented cores are depicted in Table 5.3. The most complex core is the quad-issue
one, and it can be compared to the ARM Cortex-A15.
Recall from Section 2.2.2.5 that the BOOM processor is constituted of Execute
Units (EU) , where different execution units operate on different data types and different
types of instructions. Different Execute Units may be constituted of ALUs, FPUs, load
and store units (LSU) and integer multipliers and dividers (iMul and iDiv). Each EU is
connected to a single issue port, hence the number of EUs is correlated to the processor’s
issue width, so there is one EU for the single-issue, two EUs for the dual- and four EUs for
the quad-issue processor. For the single-, dual-, and quad-issue processor configurations,
the functional units are organized as depicted in Table 5.4.
Note that single-issue core is constituted of a single Execute Unit that provides all
of the functional units supported by BOOM, while in the dual- and quad-issue cores the
functional units are spread in different Execute Units (the dual-issue configuration can be
more easily seen in Figure 2.6).
5.2.1 Hardware Occupancy and Sensitivity
There is a close relationship between the occupancy of a hardware structure and
its sensitivity to faults. Occupancy, in this context, reflects the fraction of live bits in the
component.
Regarding the relationship between sensitivity and hardware occupancy, authors
in (MUKHERJEE et al., 2003) introduced the concept of architectural vulnerability factor
(AVF) as the probability that a fault in a particular structure will result in an failure. The
AVF is estimated by tracking the fraction of bits in a processor that is necessary for the
correct execution of the workload. These bits are termed architecturally correct execution
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(ACE) bits and are related to a number of live bits in a given structure of the processor.
Similarly, bits that are not necessary for the correct execution of the workload are
termed un-ACE bits, and faults injected in such bits cannot lead to errors.
AVF analysis is an approach used to estimate the sensitivity of a processor (i.e., it
is an alternative to fault injection). The more un-ACE bits are detected in a processor, the
more error-resilient the processor is.
To a certain degree, our fault injection platform can provide an approximation to
the ACE bits in the register file by tracking the number of allocated physical registers in
each cycle that contains valid values assigned to them. However, it is possible to improve
the functionalities of the simulator so that it would provide a more sophisticated profile of
the application that executes on the processor, yielding a precise fraction of the ACE bits.
As our tool affords an approximation to the ACE bits in the RF, experiments were
conducted in order to validate the tool and to estimate such metric, and hence we could
correlate this metric with the sensitivity of the RF that was estimated by means of fault
injection.
5.2.2 The Register File and Register Renaming Circuitry Sensitivities
As a first analysis and as a means of validation of the platform, and also as an
example usage of it, we first start this section by demonstrating the influence of fault
injections performed particularly in the RF and RENAME components. Note that, due to
the high degree of controllability of our tool, we can freely choose where and when faults
are injected at bit-level and with cycle-accurate precision.
As faults were injected in the RF and RENAME components, we will start with
a quick reminder about the BOOM’s register renaming circuitry; as stated in Section
2.2.2.3, the Register Renaming process relies on two of many hardware structures:
1. A free list: A list that tracks which physical registers in the register file are currently
free. In other words, it tracks the registers that are not allocated, hence they do not
represent any logical register.
2. A busy table: For instructions residing in the issue window, this table tracks the
readiness status of their physical register operands by indicating whether they con-
tain valid values (i.e., it indicates whether the operand registers have been already
written).
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Fortunately, the implemented platform allows the monitoring of these hardware
structures (actually, everything concerning the BOOM pipeline can be monitored).
By monitoring such hardware structures, it is possible to estimate the occupancy
of the register file. From the items (1) and (2), it is expected that if a register is currently
allocated and contains valid values, than such a register possibly contains ACE bits. How-
ever, monitoring the free list and the busy table is an approximate method since it only
provides the number of currently allocated registers in the physical register file, but does
not provide an estimate of the fraction of ACE bits in the registers itself (i.e., it does not
detect the fraction of bits in the register that are ACE). Also, note that the allocated reg-
isters containing valid values are not necessarily ACE, that is because we do not monitor
whether such registers will, in fact, be used in future. These tracked registers may be
used by dynamically dead or mispeculated instructions, or maybe they will not even be
read by any other instruction, for example, and that would imply that the registers are
actually un-ACE. Therefore, we use this metric as an approximation to the ACE registers
(A-ACE) in the RF. Said again, we term the average number of currently allocated regis-
ters in the RF that hold valid values (per cycle) A-ACE registers, and this metric is taken
as an approximation for the ACE registers.
We estimated the A-ACE registers for each application by monitoring the free list
and the busy table, considering that only allocated registers containing valid values may
form ACE-bits. The approximation for the ACE registers is shown in Table 5.5. As an
example, for each cycle that the single-issue version of BOOM executed SHA, only about
3.3% of the registers in the RF may contain ACE bits.
All of the previously discussed applications from MiBench were used in order to
estimate the sensitivity of the three versions of the processor. Recall that the BOOM pro-
Table 5.5: An approximation to the average ACE registers, per cycle, in the RF (%).
Benchmark Single-issue Dual-issue Quad-issue
SHA 3.3 5.76 12.9
Rijndael (encrypt) 2.8 5.74 7.8
FFT 2.5 3.6 4.3
CRC32 2.2 4.4 17.5
String-search 2.0 3.5 3.7
Qsort 1.4 2.37 3.1
Dijkstra 1.8 2.32 2.7
Average 2.0 4.0 7.4
Source: Author
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Figure 5.1: RF and RENAME sensitivities for the each benchmark for the three processor
configurations.
(a) Single-issue: The most sensitive one.
(b) Dual-issue: RF and RENAME are more error-resilient than the single-issue ones.
(c) Quad-issue: The RF and RENAME are the most error-resilient for this core.
Source: Author
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cessor may be easily parameterized, so we could experiment with three different versions
of it: 1-, 2-, and 4-issue cores were used in order to make an extensive validation of our
platform.
In order to estimate the sensitivity of a structure S, we divided the number of
detected failures due to faults injected in S by the number of faults injected in the structure.
As an example, if F faults were injected in S, and f of them resulted in failures, then the
sensitivity of structure S is estimated by the division f/F.
The sensitivities of the RF and RENAME components for the single-, dual-, and
quad-issue are compared in Figures 5.1a, 5.1b, and 5.1c, respectively.
Recall from Section 2.2 that BOOM makes use of the register renaming strategy.
At microarchitectural-level, the RENAME structure maps logical registers to physical
ones in RF, which in turn updates the RENAME state during instruction commit. There-
fore, faults injected in RENAME tend to propagate to RF, and vice-versa, hence both
components appear to have a very similar characterization to failures, as applications that
make the RF more sensitive equally make the RENAME more sensitive, as shown in
Figure 5.1.
Note that there appears to be, in fact, a relationship between the fraction of A-
ACE registers measured in Table 5.5 and the RF and RENAME sensitivities depicted in
Figure 5.1. The RF and RENAME components are more sensitive when the processors
execute SHA, Rijndael, and FFT, which is in accordance with the values in Table 5.5. The
same analysis can be applied to the string-search, Qsort, and Dijkstra applications, which
showed to have a smaller fraction of A-ACE registers and presented fewer failures in RF
and RENAME. This analysis appears to be consistent with most of the workloads, with
exception to Qsort, which makes the RF more sensitive than string-search and CRC32,
so there is a slight mismatch between the sensitivity and the data shown in Table 5.5.
However, note that the table only suggests an approximation to the useful/live registers.
As a final analysis, note that the average fraction of A-ACE registers residing in
the register file for the single-, dual-, and quad-issue are 2.0, 4.0, and 7.4, respectively.
That, supposedly, implies that the RF is more error resilient for smaller processors since it
has lower occupancy. However, this is not true. Results showed that the single-issue’s RF
is about 17% more error prone than the dual-issue’s one, and about 33% more error prone
than the quad-issue’s. We suggest that the explanation for that resides in the fact that
the dual- and quad-issue’s RF have a residency time considerably shorter than the single-
issue’s one because they issue more instructions per cycle, which means their RFs are
80
written more frequently, hence fault injections in the RF are more likely to be overwritten.
An equivalent analysis may be conducted on the RENAME component. More complex
processors fetch and rename more instructions per cycle, which reduces the residency
time of the bits in the rename map tables and in the circuitry that handles the register
renaming. This characteristic, in turn, makes the RENAME component more resilient
to faults for processors that have bigger issue-widths and rename more instructions per
cycle.
5.2.3 The Issue Unit and Execution Units Sensitivities
For further experiments with our platform, the fault sensitivities of the issue unit
(IU) and execution units (EXE) of the three processors were evaluated.
As stated earlier, the occupancy of a hardware component reflects its sensitivity
to faults. A good metric that suffices for the estimation of occupancy of the IU and EXE
components is the number of instructions per cycle (IPC) the processor executes. More
instructions being issued and executed implies in bigger IU and EXE occupancies, respec-
tively. In other words, the more busier the pipeline is, the more sensitive the processor
is.
Table 5.6 depicts the average IPC metrics obtained for each of the workloads for
the three processor configurations. Note that the IPC depends on the processor architec-
ture, organization and the application characteristics, as some applications may be natu-
rally more parallel than others.
The fault sensitivity for the IU and EXE structures, for the single-, dual-, and
quad-issue is depicted in Figures 5.2a, 5.2b, and 5.2c, respectively. The strategy adopted
Table 5.6: IPC for each benchmark.
Benchmark Single-issue Dual-issue Quad-issue σ
SHA 0.914 1.608 2.067 0.47
CRC32 0.905 1.427 1.771 0.36
Dijkstra 0.726 1.011 1.193 0.19
String-search 0.694 0.91 0.907 0.10
Qsort 0.604 0.765 0.789 0.08
Rijndael (encrypt) 0.485 0.607 0.644 0.07
FFT 0.459 0.513 0.525 0.03
Source: Author
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Figure 5.2: IU and EXE sensitivities for the each benchmark for the three processor
configurations.
(a) Single-issue: IU and EXE are the most error-resilient ones.
(b) Dual-issue: IU and EXE are the most sensitive ones.
(c) Quad-issue: IU and EXE are slightly more resilient than the dual-issue ones.
Source: Author
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to estimate such sensitivities was the same used for the RF and RENAME structures - the
sensitivity is the division of the number of failures detected due to faults injected in the
component by the number of faults injected in it.
Note how the IU and EXE components are more sensitive to faults when the pro-
cessor executes applications with bigger IPCs, such as SHA, CRC32, and Dijkstra. On
the other hand, such components are more fault tolerant when the processor executes
workloads that have lower IPCs, such as Qsort, Rijndael, and FFT.
In order to emphasize the relationship between the IPC and the fault sensitivity
of the IU and EXE components, consider, for example, the IPC variations the workloads
presented when executed on different processors, shown in the standard deviation (σ)
column of Table 5.6. Bigger IPC variations reflect in bigger IU and EXE sensitivity
variations. Note how SHA, CRC32, and Dijkstra are the benchmarks whose IPC varied
the most when executed on different processors, this aspect implied that the sensitivities
of IU and EXE also varied the most when executing these applications. On the other
hand, applications that have a more stable IPC, such as Qsort, Rijndael and FFT caused
the EXE component sensitivity to be similar for the three processors.
A particular analysis may be conducted on the EXE component when FFT exe-
cutes. Note that this is the case where the EXE component is the most error resilient
for the three processor architectures. Among all the applications used in the fault in-
jection tests, FFT is the only one that makes extensive use of floating point operations
(GUTHAUS et al., 2001). Also, acknowledge that, in BOOM, there is only one FPU unit
regardless the issue-width (i.e., the three cores have 1 FPU). That suggests that, for the
FFT, there are structural hazards that bring the IPC down and, as a consequence, the sen-
sitivity in IU and EXE tends to be low because lower IPCs imply in lower sensitivities for
these structures.
As a final remark, note that, on average, the IU is more error prone than the EXE
structure. This aspect should be expected since the residency time of the bits in the in-
struction window is significantly longer than in EXE, because instructions must wait in
the instruction window until they can be issued and executed. On the other hand, the
registers in the EXE unit are written frequently, which increases the probability of a fault
to be masked.
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivities for all structures averaged for all the 7 benchmarks.
Source: Author
5.2.4 Average and Global Sensitivities of BOOM
The average sensitivity for each individual component is depicted in Figure 5.3.
For each processor, this average was estimated by averaging the sensitivities for each
executed benchmark. More specifically, the average sensitivity is the average of the values
in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.
Figure 5.4 compares the global sensitivity estimated for each processor, averaged
for all the benchmarks. In order to estimate the global sensitivity, we weighted the sen-
sitivity of each individual component on the fraction of area occupied by them, which is
approximated by number of flip-flops (bits) of the component. We adopted this strategy
because the fault rate (i.e., the number of faults per unit of time) experienced by a par-
Figure 5.4: Sensitivity for each processor averaged for all the benchmarks.
Source: Author
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Table 5.7: Average sensitivity for each benchmark (%).
Benchmark Single-issue Dual-issue Quad-issue
SHA 4.22 4.58 3.42
Rijndael (encrypt) 3.68 2.95 1.90
FFT 3.90 2.82 1.54
CRC32 3.13 3.30 2.29
Qsort 3.98 3.09 1.51
Dijkstra 2.38 2.59 1.47
String-search 2.67 2.29 1.71
Source: Author
ticular part of the processor is proportional to its area, in which bigger structures tend to
be more affected by faults, as opposed to smaller ones. The global sensitivity may be
modeled by the equation bellow:
GlobalSensitivity =
1
TotalFF
6∑
s=1
(Failures[s]/Faults[s])× FF [s]
In the formula above, s represents the six different structures where faults were injected,
TotalFF represents the total number of flip-flops calculated by adding up the bits of the six
structures, Failures[s] is the number of failures caused due to faults injected in structure s,
Faults[s] is the number of faults injected in structure s, and FF[s] represents the number
of flip-flops in the structure. Note that the division FF[s]/TotalFF represents the approx-
imate fraction of area occupied by structure s1. When this fraction is multiplied by the
component sensitivity, and all the factors are added together, it yields an approximation
to the global sensitivity of the processor. Using this formula, the approximate global sen-
sitivities given for the single-, dual-, and quad-issue cores are 3.18%, 2.84%, and 1.97%,
respectively. That means, for example, if a fault hits the single-issue processor, then there
is a 3.18% probability that a failure will occur.
Table 5.7 summarizes the data in Figure 5.4 by adding up together SDCs, hangs,
and aborted simulations due to crashes for all the workloads. When the single-issue pro-
cessor executes SHA, for instance, the sensitivity of the processor is about 4.22%, and it
can be understood as the probability that a failure will occur if a fault is injected.
Figures 5.4 and 5.3, and Table 5.7 lead to some conclusions that can be summa-
1We consider the number of flip-flops as an approximation to the area of each component. However, this
metric is not very accurate since we do not consider the gate-level model of the processors. More precise
area information may be estimated by making use of synthesis tools.
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rized as follows:
1. Figure 5.3:
• The RF and RENAME are the most sensitive components, and their sensi-
tivities tend to decrease for more complex processors, arguably due to the
decrease in their residency times.
• There is no single trend for the sensitivity in the IU and EXE components,
which increases for the dual-issue, but decreases for the quad-issue.
• The BPU and ROB components are highly fault-tolerant and are multiplied
by a factor of ten. For the quad-issue, faults injected in the BPU and ROB
never led to failures. Regarding the ROB, have in mind that, in BOOM, this
component does not hold temporary values (as happens in many processor
architectures, such as the Pentium 4 and the ARM Cortex A57), because the
results of both speculative and non-speculative instructions always reside in
the RF. We believe that this is one of the factors that makes the ROB consid-
erably error-resilient.
2. Figure 5.4: The single- and quad-issue processors are the most and least error-prone
ones mainly because of the influence of the RF and RENAME structures, which are
the structures that influence the global sensitivity the most.
3. Table 5.7: The fault sensitivity does not depend only on the processor architecture
and its hardware structures, it also highly depends on the application the processor
executes since two different algorithms that execute on the same processor may
cause the processor to respond differently when faults are injected into it.
As a final remark, note that the results exposed in this chapter were only possible
due to the controllable and low-level nature of the fault injection platform. By using
another kind of fault injection tool, such as the referenced ones in section 3.4, it would
not be possible to inject faults in the same way it was done in this work. More specifically,
our platform not only provides bit-level access to the processors but also provides all of
the real bits present in them, while affording complete control over where and when faults
are supposed to be injected. Note, also, that the proposed platform is highly configurable,
hence flexible, so experiments with different processors could be easily be performed,
yielding a vast design space to be explored.
86
6 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
This work presented a fault injection platform implemented over an RTL C++-
implemented simulator of the BOOM processor.
Due to the existent shortcomings imposed by the hardware-based fault injection
strategies and the methods based on high-level simulators, we found out that there is a gap
between these two techniques that can only be bridged by means of the development of a
tool that inherits both the positive features of the hardware-based method (representative)
and the simulation-based one (controllable and cheap). The trade-off between such fault
injection techniques was reviewed in Chapter 3.
The development of the fault injection platform is based on the infrastructure of an
RTL controllable simulator of BOOM, which was possible due to the compilation strate-
gies of the Chisel language which generates the low-level cycle-accurate C++ simulator
automatically. Because it works at RTL and it is controllable, we believe that the deficien-
cies imposed by the hardware- and simulation-based techniques were traded off. Until a
short time ago, and to the best of our knowledge, there was no publicly-available fault
injection platform such as the one we developed and presented in this work.
The implementation of the platform was purely based on leveraging the infras-
tructure of the Chisel→C++ exported simulator: the strategy adopted consisted roughly
in coupling separate components to the original exported BOOM’s simulator that allowed
us to inject faults in each individual bit of the processor. Moreover, we developed a check-
pointing mechanism for the simulator that provided a really significant speedup for our
fault injection campaigns. All of the strategies adopted to implement the tool is explored
in Chapter 4.
As BOOM is a highly parameterizable processor, we could experiment with three
different versions of this core: we generated three different fault injectors for a single-, a
dual-, and a quad-issue version of the processor. The functionality of each fault injector
is exactly the same except that they instantiate different processors.
In order to evaluate our platform, we used some applications from the MiBench
benchmark and injected faults in the three versions of BOOM. Our fault injection tests
explored in Chapter 5 were purely conducted in order to explore and validate our fault
injection platform. However, future evaluations could take a more sophisticated approach
by using statistical models concerning fault injection significance for each processor.
Nonetheless, the evaluations of our platform provided some relevant results regarding the
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sensitivity of each of the experimented processor. The experiments were efficient enough
to confirm that there is a significant difference in terms of sensitivity for different proces-
sors; more complex processors tend to be more error resilient. Also, we confirmed that
there is a close relationship between the characteristics of the application the processor
executes and the processor’s sensitivity.
For the experiments, we injected faults in six different components of the three
versions of BOOM: the register file, the register renaming circuitry, the instruction win-
dow, the registers associated with the execute stage of the pipeline, the branch prediction
unit and the reorder buffer. The results showed that, for each application, faults injected in
each of these six different structures may lead to significantly different sensitivity levels
due to the nature of the application and the influence of the component itself.
Future work may use our platform in order to evaluate the efficacy of traditional
fault tolerance strategies, especially the software-implemented ones. For example, in-
struction redundancy techniques may be applied in a given application, then our platform
could execute the application while injecting faults in the processor. One could then ob-
serve the behavior of the processor while running applications that benefit from instruc-
tion redundancy and, as a result, one could estimate how efficient such method is. Note
that, since our platform is controllable, we can inject faults in any specific component
and estimate what hardware components the fault tolerance system protects better. For
example, if faults affect the reorder buffer, how much instruction redundancy is necessary
to protect the application? At what cost?
Another example of fault tolerance technique that could be evaluated using our
platform is the Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) implemented both in software and
hardware. The hardware-implemented TMR imposes severe overheads in terms area,
energy and performance. This way, when such a technique is applied, it is important
to know well what parts of the processor could benefit the most from such technique.
For example, a TMR deployed in a hardware component that already presents affordable
levels of fault tolerance may be inconvenient.
Beyond evaluating the traditional fault tolerance strategies, our platform may be
used to guide the development of other sorts of low-cost fault tolerance methods. Once a
new fault tolerance technique is implemented, we can then use our fault injector in order
to evaluate its efficacy.
We could also use the platform in order to evaluate already existent fault sensitivity
methods. For example, we could use the BOOM’s simulator to conduct an AVF analysis
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of the processor for specific applications, after such analysis is performed, faults could be
injected in the processor and the results could be compared to the AVF analysis. Which
one is faster? AVF or fault injection? Which one provides the best coverage in terms of
characterization of the processor to faults?
Beyond evaluating fault tolerance systems, one could also use the platform in order
to evaluate the levels of fault tolerance of different applications. In other words, some
applications are better than others in terms of fault masking. One could investigate, in
details, what are the characteristics that make an application more or less fault tolerant.
For example, what kind of data structures are more fault tolerant? Also, does compiler
optimizations have an effect on the levels of fault masking? How much?
For any evaluated fault tolerance system, one could use our platform coupled with
the McPAT framework (LI et al., 2009) in order to evaluate the energy consumed by
it, hence the relationship between energy spent by the fault tolerance system and fault
detection and removal could be explored.
Future work could also use the BOOM’s Verilog in order to extract the area of the
processor and, if possible, extract the area of each individual component where faults can
be injected. As a result, one could estimate more precise levels of sensitivity than the ones
we presented in this work.
Finally, even though in this work we only explored the BOOM processor, future
work may evaluate the resilience of other systems implemented in Chisel by adopting
strategies similar to the ones adopted for BOOM.
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APPENDIX A — SENSITIVITY TABLES
Table A.1: Sensitivities for the single-issue core (%).
Benchmark RF RENAME IU EXE BPU ROB Total
SHA 1.94 0.80 0.53 0.81 0.04 0.09 4.22
CRC32 1.07 0.49 0.71 0.73 0.04 0.09 3.13
String-search 1.07 0.43 0.30 0.74 0.04 0.09 2.67
FFT 1.84 0.86 0.38 0.40 0.05 0.38 3.90
Qsort 1.39 0.45 0.44 0.64 0.05 1.01 3.98
Dijkstra 0.62 0.51 0.50 0.61 0.04 0.09 2.38
Rijndael (enc) 1.91 0.84 0.30 0.49 0.04 0.09 3.68
Average 1.41 0.63 0.45 0.63 0.04 0.03 3.18
Source: Author
Table A.2: Sensitivities for the dual-issue core (%).
Benchmark RF RENAME IU EXE BPU ROB Total
SHA 1.12 0.74 0.89 1.61 0.03 0.18 4.58
CRC32 0.55 0.38 0.94 1.12 0.02 0.29 3.30
String-search 0.70 0.40 0.33 0.74 0.02 0.11 2.29
FFT 1.03 0.68 0.27 0.47 0.02 0.36 2.82
Qsort 0.79 0.35 0.52 0.79 0.02 0.62 3.09
Dijkstra 0.36 0.40 0.51 0.94 0.02 0.36 2.59
Rijndael (enc) 1.16 0.71 0.38 0.68 0.02 0.00 2.95
Average 0.81 0.52 0.55 0.90 0.02 0.03 2.84
Source: Author
Table A.3: Sensitivities for the quad-issue core (%).
Benchmark RF RENAME IU EXE BPU ROB Total
SHA 0.68 0.41 0.79 1.54 0.00 0.00 3.42
CRC32 0.40 0.27 0.73 0.89 0.00 0.00 2.29
String-search 0.37 0.24 0.32 0.78 0.00 0.00 1.71
FFT 0.58 0.37 0.16 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.54
Qsort 0.43 0.16 0.35 0.57 0.00 0.00 1.51
Dijkstra 0.23 0.19 0.31 0.74 0.00 0.00 1.47
Rijndael (enc) 0.64 0.42 0.32 0.53 0.00 0.00 1.90
Average 0.48 0.29 0.42 0.78 0.00 0.00 1.97
Source: Author
